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Network Working Group                                         O. Gsenger
Internet-Draft                                             June 18, 2007
Expires: December 20, 2007


                secure anycast tunneling protocol (SATP)
           draft-gsenger-secure-anycast-tunneling-protocol-00

Status of this Memo

   By submitting this Internet-Draft, each author represents that any
   applicable patent or other IPR claims of which he or she is aware
   have been or will be disclosed, and any of which he or she becomes
   aware will be disclosed, in accordance with Section 6 of BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
   Task Force (IETF), its areas, and its working groups.  Note that
   other groups may also distribute working documents as Internet-
   Drafts.

   Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
   and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
   time.  It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
   material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

   The list of current Internet-Drafts can be accessed at
   http://www.ietf.org/ietf/1id-abstracts.txt.

   The list of Internet-Draft Shadow Directories can be accessed at
   http://www.ietf.org/shadow.html.

   This Internet-Draft will expire on December 20, 2007.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (C) The IETF Trust (2007).















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Internet-Draft  secure anycast tunneling protocol (SATP)       June 2007


Abstract

   The secure anycast tunneling protocol (SATP) defines a protocol used
   for communication between any combination of unicast and anycast
   tunnel endpoints.  It allows tunneling of every ETHER TYPE protocol
   (ethernet, ip ...).  SATP directly includes cryptography and message
   authentication based on the methodes used by SRTP.  It can be used as
   an encrypted alternative to IP Encapsulation within IP [3] and
   Generic Routing Encapsulation (GRE) [4].  It supports both anycast
   receivers and senders.


Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  3
     1.1.  Notational Conventions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  3
   2.  Motivation and usage scenarios . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  4
     2.1.  Usage scenarions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  4
       2.1.1.  Tunneling from unicast hosts over anycast routers
               to other unicast hosts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  4
       2.1.2.  Tunneling from unicast hosts to anycast networks . . .  5
       2.1.3.  Redundant tunnel connection of 2 networks  . . . . . .  5
     2.2.  Encapsulation  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  6
   3.  Using SATP on top of IP  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  8
     3.1.  Fragmentation  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  8
     3.2.  ICMP messages  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  8
   4.  Protocol specification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  9
     4.1.  Header format  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  9
     4.2.  sender ID  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  9
     4.3.  sequence number  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  9
     4.4.  payload  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  9
     4.5.  padding (OPTIONAL) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  9
     4.6.  padding count  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
     4.7.  payload type field . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
       4.7.1.  MKI  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
       4.7.2.  authentication tag . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
     4.8.  Encryption . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
   5.  Security Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
     5.1.  Replay protection  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
   6.  IANA Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
   7.  References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
     7.1.  Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
     7.2.  Informational References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
   Author's Address . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
   Intellectual Property and Copyright Statements . . . . . . . . . . 17






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1.  Introduction

   SATP is somehow a mixture of a generic encapsulation protocol like
   GRE [4] and a secure tunneling protocol as IPsec [5] in tunnel mode.
   To save some header overhead it uses the encryption technices of SRTP
   [1].  It supports peer to peer tunnels, where tunnel endpoints can be
   any combination of unicast, multicast or anycast hosts, so it defines
   a Host Anycast Service [6]

1.1.  Notational Conventions

   The keywords "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
   document are to be interpreted as described in RFC2119 [2].





































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2.  Motivation and usage scenarios

   This section gives an overview of possible usage scenarios.  Please
   note, that the protocols used in the figures are only examples and
   that SATP itself does not care about either transport protocols or
   encapsulated protocols.  Routing is not done by SATP and each
   implemetation MAY choose it's own way of doing this task (e.g. using
   functions provided by the operating system).  SATP is used only to
   encapsulate and encrypt data.

2.1.  Usage scenarions

2.1.1.  Tunneling from unicast hosts over anycast routers to other
        unicast hosts

   An example of SATP used to tunnel in a unicast client - anycast
   server model

                       --------- router -----------
                      /                            \
       unicast ------+---------- router ------------+------ unicast
       host           \                            /        host
                       --------- router -----------

     unicast  | encrypted     |  anycast  | encrypted     |  unicast
     tunnel   | communication |  tunnel   | communication |  tunnel
     endpoint | using SATP    |  endpoint | using SATP    |  endpoint

                                 Figure 1

   In this scenario the payload gets encapsuleted into a SATP packet by
   a unicast host and gets transmitted to one of the anycast routers.
   It than gets decapsulated by the router.  This router makes a routing
   descision based on the underlying protocol and transmits a new SATP
   package to one or more unicast hosts depending on the routing
   descition.















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2.1.2.  Tunneling from unicast hosts to anycast networks

   An example of SATP used to encrypt data between a unicast host and
   anycast networks

                          -------Router -+---- DNS Server
                         /                \
                        /                  --- 6to4 Router
                       /
       unicast -------+----------Router --+--- DNS Server
       host            \                   \
                        \                   --- 6to4 Router
                         \
                          -------Router -+---- DNS Server
                                          \
                                           --- 6to4 Router

     unicast  | encrypted     |  anycast  | plaintext
     tunnel   | communication |  tunnel   | anycast
     endpoint | using SATP    |  endpoint | services


                                 Figure 2

   When the unicast hosts wants to transmit data to one of the anycast
   DNS servers, it encapsulates the data and sends a SATP packet to the
   anycast address of the routers.  The packet arrives at one of the
   routers, gets decapsulated and routed to the DNS server.  This method
   can be used to tunnel between a clients and networks providing
   anycast services.  It can also be used the other way to virtually
   locate a unicast service within anycasted networks.

2.1.3.  Redundant tunnel connection of 2 networks

   An example of SATP used to connect 2 networks

                 Router -----------   ---------------Router
               /                   \ /                     \
       Network - Router ------------x                       Network
          A    \                   / \                     /   B
                 Router -----------   ---------------Router

               | packets       |  packets  |  packets      |
    plaintext  | get           |  take a   |  get          | plaintext
    packets    | de/encrypted  |  random   |  de/encrypted | packets
               |de/encapsulated|   path    |de/encapsulated|





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                                 Figure 3

   Network A has multiple routers, that act as gateway/tunnel endpoints
   to another network B. This is done to build a redundant encrypted
   tunnel connection between the two networks.  All tunnel endpoints of
   network A share the same anycast address and all tunnel endpoints of
   network B share another anycast address.  When a packet from network
   A gets transmitted to network B, it first arrives on one of network
   A's border routers.  Which router is used is determined by network
   A's internal routing.  This router encapsulates the package and sends
   it to the anycast address of the network B routers.  The SATP packet
   arrives at one of network B's routers and gets decapsulated and
   routed to it's destination within network B.

2.2.  Encapsulation

   SATP does not depend on which lower layer protocols is used, but this
   section gives an example of how packets could look like.

































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   Examples of SATP used with different lower layer and payload
   protocols

       +------+-----+-------------------------------+
       |      |     |      + ---------------+------ |
       | IPv6 | UDP | SATP | Ethernet 802.3 | ... | |
       |      |     |      +----------------+-----+ |
       +------+-----+-------------------------------+

   Tunneling of Ethernet over UDP/IPv6

       +------+-----+---------------------------+
       |      |     |      +------+-----+-----+ |
       | IPv4 | UDP | SATP | IPv6 | UDP | RTP | |
       |      |     |      +------+-----+-----+ |
       +------+-----+---------------------------+

   Tunneling of IPv6 over UDP/IPv4 with RTP payload

       +------+-------------------------------+
       |      |      + ---------------+------ |
       | IPv6 | SATP | Ethernet 802.3 | ... | |
       |      |      +----------------+-----+ |
       +------+-------------------------------+

   Tunneling of Ethernet over IPv6

       +------+---------------------------+
       |      |      +------+-----+-----+ |
       | IPv4 | SATP | IPv6 | UDP | RTP | |
       |      |      +------+-----+-----+ |
       +------+---------------------------+

   Tunneling of IPv6 over IPv4 with RTP payload

                                 Figure 4















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3.  Using SATP on top of IP

3.1.  Fragmentation

   The only way of fully supporting fragmentation would be to
   synchronise fragments between all anycast servers.  This is
   considered to be too much overhead, so there are two non perfect
   solutions for these problems.  Either fragmentation HAS TO be
   disabled or if not all fragments arrive at the same server the ip
   datagramm HAS TO be discarded.  As routing changes are not expected
   to occure very frequently, the encapsulated protocol can do a
   retransmission and all fragments will arrive at the new server.

   If the payload ip headers's Don't Fragment (DF) bit is set, than the
   DF bit of the outer ip header HAS TO be set as well.

3.2.  ICMP messages

   ICMP messages MUST be relayed according to rfc2003 section 4 [3].
   This is needed for path MTU detection.































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4.  Protocol specification

4.1.  Header format

   Protocol Format

        0                   1                   2                   3
      0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
     +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
     |                         sequence number                       | |
     +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+#+#+#+#+#+#+#+#+#+#+#+#+#+#+#+#+ |
     |           sender ID           #                               | |
   +#+#+#+#+#+#+#+#+#+#+#+#+#+#+#+#+#+                               + |
   | |              ....        payload        ...                   | |
   | |-------------------------------+-------------------------------+ |
   | | padding (OPT) | pad count(OPT)|         payload type          | |
   +#+#+#+#+#+#+#+#+#+#+#+#+#+#+#+#+#+#+#+#+#+#+#+#+#+#+#+#+#+#+#+#+#+-+
   | ~                          MKI (OPTIONAL)                       ~ |
   | +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ |
   | :                 authentication tag (RECOMMENDED)              : |
   | +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ |
   |                                                                   |
   +- Encrypted Portion                       Authenticated Portion ---+

                                 Figure 5

4.2.  sender ID

   The sender ID is a 16 bit unsigned integer.  It HAS TO be unique for
   every sender sharing the same anycast address

4.3.  sequence number

   The sequence number is a 32 bit unsigned integer in network byte
   order.  It starts with a random value and is increased by 1 for every
   sent packet.  After the maximum value, it starts over from 0.  This
   overrun causes the ROC to be increased.

4.4.  payload

   A packet of the type payload type (e.g. an IP packet).

4.5.  padding (OPTIONAL)

   Padding of max 255 octets.  None of the pre-defined encryption
   transforms uses any padding; for these, the plaintext and encrypted
   payload sizes match exactly.  Transforms are based on transforms of
   the SRTP protocol and these transforms might use the RTP padding



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   format, so a RTP like padding is supported.  If padding field is
   present, than the padding count field MUST be set to the padding
   lenght.

4.6.  padding count

   The number of octets of the padding field.  This field is optional.
   It's presence is signaled by the key management and not by this
   protocol.  If this field isn't present, the padding field MUST NOT be
   present as well.

4.7.  payload type field

   The payload type field defines the payload protocol.  ETHER TYPE
   protocol numbers are used.  See IANA assigned ethernet numbers [7] .
   The values 0000-05DC are reserverd and MUST NOT be used.

   Some examples for protocol types

   HEX
   0000 Reserved
   .... Reserved
   05DC Reserved
   0800 Internet IP (IPv4)
   6558 transparent ethernet bridging
   86DD IPv6

                                 Figure 6

4.7.1.  MKI

   The MKI (Master Key Identifier) is OPTIONAL and of configurable
   length.  See SRTP Section 3.1 [1] for details

4.7.2.  authentication tag

   The authentication tag is RECOMMENDED and of configurable length.  It
   contains a cryptographic checksum of the sender ID, sequence number
   and the encrypted portion, but not of the MKI.  On sender side
   encryption HAS TO be done before calculating the authentication tag.
   A receiver HAS TO calculate the authentication tag before decrypting
   the encrypted portion.

4.8.  Encryption

   Encryption is done in the same way as for SRTP [1].  This section
   will only discuss some small changes that HAVE TO be made.  Please
   read SRTP RFC3711 section 3-9 [1] for details.



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   The least significant bits of SSRC are replaced by the sender ID and
   the rest is filled with zeros.  For the SRTP SEQ the 16 least
   significant bits of the SATP sequence number are used and the 16 most
   significant bits of the sequence number replace the 16 least
   significant bits of the SRTP ROC.

   Difference between SRTP and SATP

          0                   1                   2                   3
        0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
       +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
       |                     SATP    sequence number                   |
       +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
                                      =
       +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
       | SRTP ROC least significant   |         SRTP SEQ               |
       +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+


          0                   1                   2                   3
        0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
       +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
       |0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0|       SATP sender ID          |
       +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
                                      =
       +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
       |                           SRTP SSRC                           |
       +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+

                                 Figure 7





















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5.  Security Considerations

   As SATP uses the same encrytion technics as SRTP [1], it shares the
   same security issues.  This section will only discuss some small
   changes.  Please read SRTP RFC3711 section 9 [1] for details.

5.1.  Replay protection

   Replay protection is done by a replay list.  Every anycast receiver
   has it's own replay list, which SHOULDN'T be syncronised, because of
   massive overhead.  This leads to an additional possible attack.  A
   attacker is able to replay a captured packet once to every anycast
   reciever.  This attack is considered of be very unlikely, because
   multiple attack hosts in different loactions are needed to reach the
   seperate anycast receivers and the number of replays is limited to
   the count of receivers - 1.  Such replays might also happen because
   of routing problems, so a payload protocol HAS TO be robust against a
   small number of duplicated packages.  The window size and position
   HAS TO be syncronised between multible anycast receivers to limit
   this attack.































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6.  IANA Considerations

   The protocol is intended to be used on top of IP or on top of UDP (to
   be compatible with NAT routers), so UDP and IP protocol numberes have
   to be assiged by IANA.














































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7.  References

7.1.  Normative References

   [1]  Baugher, M., McGrew, D., Naslund, M., Carrara, E., and K.
        Norrman, "The Secure Real-time Transport Protocol (SRTP)",
        RFC 3711, March 2004.

   [2]  Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement
        Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.

   [3]  Perkins, C., "IP Encapsulation within IP", RFC 2003,
        October 1996.

7.2.  Informational References

   [4]  Farinacci, D., Li, T., Hanks, S., Meyer, D., and P. Traina,
        "Generic Routing Encapsulation (GRE)", RFC 2784, March 2000.

   [5]  Kent, S. and R. Atkinson, "Security Architecture for the
        Internet Protocol", RFC 2401, November 1998.

   [6]  Partridge, C., Mendez, T., and W. Milliken, "Host Anycasting
        Service", RFC 1546, November 1993.



























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URIs

   [7]  <http://www.iana.org/assignments/ethernet-numbers>
















































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Author's Address

   Othmar Gsenger
   Puerstingerstr 32
   Saalfelden  5760
   AT

   Phone:
   Email: satp@gsenger.com
   URI:   http://www.gsenger.com/satp/









































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