diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'keyexchange/isakmpd-20041012/x509.c')
| -rw-r--r-- | keyexchange/isakmpd-20041012/x509.c | 1439 |
1 files changed, 0 insertions, 1439 deletions
diff --git a/keyexchange/isakmpd-20041012/x509.c b/keyexchange/isakmpd-20041012/x509.c deleted file mode 100644 index 0897557..0000000 --- a/keyexchange/isakmpd-20041012/x509.c +++ /dev/null @@ -1,1439 +0,0 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: x509.c,v 1.95 2004/08/10 19:21:01 deraadt Exp $ */ -/* $EOM: x509.c,v 1.54 2001/01/16 18:42:16 ho Exp $ */ - -/* - * Copyright (c) 1998, 1999 Niels Provos. All rights reserved. - * Copyright (c) 1999, 2000, 2001 Niklas Hallqvist. All rights reserved. - * Copyright (c) 1999, 2000, 2001 Angelos D. Keromytis. All rights reserved. - * - * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without - * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions - * are met: - * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright - * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. - * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright - * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the - * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. - * - * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR - * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES - * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. - * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, - * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT - * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, - * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY - * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT - * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF - * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. - */ - -/* - * This code was written under funding by Ericsson Radio Systems. - */ - -#ifdef USE_X509 - -#include <sys/param.h> -#include <sys/types.h> -#include <sys/stat.h> -#include <dirent.h> -#include <errno.h> -#include <fcntl.h> -#include <stdio.h> -#include <stdlib.h> -#include <string.h> -#include <unistd.h> - -#ifdef USE_POLICY -#include <regex.h> -#include <keynote.h> -#endif /* USE_POLICY */ - -#include "sysdep.h" - -#include "cert.h" -#include "conf.h" -#include "exchange.h" -#include "hash.h" -#include "ike_auth.h" -#include "ipsec.h" -#include "log.h" -#include "math_mp.h" -#include "monitor.h" -#include "policy.h" -#include "sa.h" -#include "util.h" -#include "x509.h" - -static u_int16_t x509_hash(u_int8_t *, size_t); -static void x509_hash_init(void); -static X509 *x509_hash_find(u_int8_t *, size_t); -static int x509_hash_enter(X509 *); - -/* - * X509_STOREs do not support subjectAltNames, so we have to build - * our own hash table. - */ - -/* - * XXX Actually this store is not really useful, we never use it as we have - * our own hash table. It also gets collisons if we have several certificates - * only differing in subjectAltName. - */ -static X509_STORE *x509_certs = 0; -static X509_STORE *x509_cas = 0; - -/* Initial number of bits used as hash. */ -#define INITIAL_BUCKET_BITS 6 - -struct x509_hash { - LIST_ENTRY(x509_hash) link; - - X509 *cert; -}; - -static LIST_HEAD(x509_list, x509_hash) *x509_tab = 0; - -/* Works both as a maximum index and a mask. */ -static int bucket_mask; - -#ifdef USE_POLICY -/* - * Given an X509 certificate, create a KeyNote assertion where - * Issuer/Subject -> Authorizer/Licensees. - * XXX RSA-specific. - */ -int -x509_generate_kn(int id, X509 *cert) -{ - char *fmt = "Authorizer: \"rsa-hex:%s\"\nLicensees: \"rsa-hex:%s" - "\"\nConditions: %s >= \"%s\" && %s <= \"%s\";\n"; - char *ikey, *skey, *buf, isname[256], subname[256]; - char *fmt2 = "Authorizer: \"DN:%s\"\nLicensees: \"DN:%s\"\n" - "Conditions: %s >= \"%s\" && %s <= \"%s\";\n"; - X509_NAME *issuer, *subject; - struct keynote_deckey dc; - X509_STORE_CTX csc; - X509_OBJECT obj; - X509 *icert; - RSA *key; - time_t tt; - char before[15], after[15], *timecomp, *timecomp2; - ASN1_TIME *tm; - int i, buf_len; - - LOG_DBG((LOG_POLICY, 90, - "x509_generate_kn: generating KeyNote policy for certificate %p", - cert)); - - issuer = X509_get_issuer_name(cert); - subject = X509_get_subject_name(cert); - - /* Missing or self-signed, ignore cert but don't report failure. */ - if (!issuer || !subject || !X509_name_cmp(issuer, subject)) - return 1; - - if (!x509_cert_get_key(cert, &key)) { - LOG_DBG((LOG_POLICY, 30, - "x509_generate_kn: failed to get public key from cert")); - return 0; - } - dc.dec_algorithm = KEYNOTE_ALGORITHM_RSA; - dc.dec_key = key; - ikey = kn_encode_key(&dc, INTERNAL_ENC_PKCS1, ENCODING_HEX, - KEYNOTE_PUBLIC_KEY); - if (keynote_errno == ERROR_MEMORY) { - log_print("x509_generate_kn: failed to get memory for " - "public key"); - RSA_free(key); - LOG_DBG((LOG_POLICY, 30, "x509_generate_kn: cannot get " - "subject key")); - return 0; - } - if (!ikey) { - RSA_free(key); - LOG_DBG((LOG_POLICY, 30, "x509_generate_kn: cannot get " - "subject key")); - return 0; - } - RSA_free(key); - - /* Now find issuer's certificate so we can get the public key. */ - X509_STORE_CTX_init(&csc, x509_cas, cert, NULL); - if (X509_STORE_get_by_subject(&csc, X509_LU_X509, issuer, &obj) != - X509_LU_X509) { - X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(&csc); - X509_STORE_CTX_init(&csc, x509_certs, cert, NULL); - if (X509_STORE_get_by_subject(&csc, X509_LU_X509, issuer, &obj) - != X509_LU_X509) { - X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(&csc); - LOG_DBG((LOG_POLICY, 30, - "x509_generate_kn: no certificate found for " - "issuer")); - return 0; - } - } - X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(&csc); - icert = obj.data.x509; - - if (icert == NULL) { - LOG_DBG((LOG_POLICY, 30, "x509_generate_kn: " - "missing certificates, cannot construct X509 chain")); - free(ikey); - return 0; - } - if (!x509_cert_get_key(icert, &key)) { - LOG_DBG((LOG_POLICY, 30, - "x509_generate_kn: failed to get public key from cert")); - free(ikey); - return 0; - } - X509_OBJECT_free_contents(&obj); - - dc.dec_algorithm = KEYNOTE_ALGORITHM_RSA; - dc.dec_key = key; - skey = kn_encode_key(&dc, INTERNAL_ENC_PKCS1, ENCODING_HEX, - KEYNOTE_PUBLIC_KEY); - if (keynote_errno == ERROR_MEMORY) { - log_error("x509_generate_kn: failed to get memory for public " - "key"); - free(ikey); - RSA_free(key); - LOG_DBG((LOG_POLICY, 30, "x509_generate_kn: cannot get issuer " - "key")); - return 0; - } - if (!skey) { - free(ikey); - RSA_free(key); - LOG_DBG((LOG_POLICY, 30, "x509_generate_kn: cannot get issuer " - "key")); - return 0; - } - RSA_free(key); - - buf_len = strlen(fmt) + strlen(ikey) + strlen(skey) + 56; - buf = calloc(buf_len, sizeof(char)); - buf_len *= sizeof(char); - if (!buf) { - log_error("x509_generate_kn: " - "failed to allocate memory for KeyNote credential"); - free(ikey); - free(skey); - return 0; - } - if (((tm = X509_get_notBefore(cert)) == NULL) || - (tm->type != V_ASN1_UTCTIME && - tm->type != V_ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME)) { - tt = time(0); - strftime(before, 14, "%Y%m%d%H%M%S", localtime(&tt)); - timecomp = "LocalTimeOfDay"; - } else { - if (tm->data[tm->length - 1] == 'Z') { - timecomp = "GMTTimeOfDay"; - i = tm->length - 2; - } else { - timecomp = "LocalTimeOfDay"; - i = tm->length - 1; - } - - for (; i >= 0; i--) { - if (tm->data[i] < '0' || tm->data[i] > '9') { - LOG_DBG((LOG_POLICY, 30, - "x509_generate_kn: invalid data in " - "NotValidBefore time field")); - free(ikey); - free(skey); - free(buf); - return 0; - } - } - - if (tm->type == V_ASN1_UTCTIME) { - if ((tm->length < 10) || (tm->length > 13)) { - LOG_DBG((LOG_POLICY, 30, - "x509_generate_kn: invalid length " - "of NotValidBefore time field (%d)", - tm->length)); - free(ikey); - free(skey); - free(buf); - return 0; - } - /* Validity checks. */ - if ((tm->data[2] != '0' && tm->data[2] != '1') || - (tm->data[2] == '0' && tm->data[3] == '0') || - (tm->data[2] == '1' && tm->data[3] > '2') || - (tm->data[4] > '3') || - (tm->data[4] == '0' && tm->data[5] == '0') || - (tm->data[4] == '3' && tm->data[5] > '1') || - (tm->data[6] > '2') || - (tm->data[6] == '2' && tm->data[7] > '3') || - (tm->data[8] > '5')) { - LOG_DBG((LOG_POLICY, 30, - "x509_generate_kn: invalid value in " - "NotValidBefore time field")); - free(ikey); - free(skey); - free(buf); - return 0; - } - /* Stupid UTC tricks. */ - if (tm->data[0] < '5') - snprintf(before, sizeof before, "20%s", - tm->data); - else - snprintf(before, sizeof before, "19%s", - tm->data); - } else { /* V_ASN1_GENERICTIME */ - if ((tm->length < 12) || (tm->length > 15)) { - LOG_DBG((LOG_POLICY, 30, - "x509_generate_kn: invalid length of " - "NotValidBefore time field (%d)", - tm->length)); - free(ikey); - free(skey); - free(buf); - return 0; - } - /* Validity checks. */ - if ((tm->data[4] != '0' && tm->data[4] != '1') || - (tm->data[4] == '0' && tm->data[5] == '0') || - (tm->data[4] == '1' && tm->data[5] > '2') || - (tm->data[6] > '3') || - (tm->data[6] == '0' && tm->data[7] == '0') || - (tm->data[6] == '3' && tm->data[7] > '1') || - (tm->data[8] > '2') || - (tm->data[8] == '2' && tm->data[9] > '3') || - (tm->data[10] > '5')) { - LOG_DBG((LOG_POLICY, 30, - "x509_generate_kn: invalid value in " - "NotValidBefore time field")); - free(ikey); - free(skey); - free(buf); - return 0; - } - snprintf(before, sizeof before, "%s", tm->data); - } - - /* Fix missing seconds. */ - if (tm->length < 12) { - before[12] = '0'; - before[13] = '0'; - } - /* This will overwrite trailing 'Z'. */ - before[14] = '\0'; - } - - tm = X509_get_notAfter(cert); - if (tm == NULL && - (tm->type != V_ASN1_UTCTIME && - tm->type != V_ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME)) { - tt = time(0); - strftime(after, 14, "%Y%m%d%H%M%S", localtime(&tt)); - timecomp2 = "LocalTimeOfDay"; - } else { - if (tm->data[tm->length - 1] == 'Z') { - timecomp2 = "GMTTimeOfDay"; - i = tm->length - 2; - } else { - timecomp2 = "LocalTimeOfDay"; - i = tm->length - 1; - } - - for (; i >= 0; i--) { - if (tm->data[i] < '0' || tm->data[i] > '9') { - LOG_DBG((LOG_POLICY, 30, - "x509_generate_kn: invalid data in " - "NotValidAfter time field")); - free(ikey); - free(skey); - free(buf); - return 0; - } - } - - if (tm->type == V_ASN1_UTCTIME) { - if ((tm->length < 10) || (tm->length > 13)) { - LOG_DBG((LOG_POLICY, 30, - "x509_generate_kn: invalid length of " - "NotValidAfter time field (%d)", - tm->length)); - free(ikey); - free(skey); - free(buf); - return 0; - } - /* Validity checks. */ - if ((tm->data[2] != '0' && tm->data[2] != '1') || - (tm->data[2] == '0' && tm->data[3] == '0') || - (tm->data[2] == '1' && tm->data[3] > '2') || - (tm->data[4] > '3') || - (tm->data[4] == '0' && tm->data[5] == '0') || - (tm->data[4] == '3' && tm->data[5] > '1') || - (tm->data[6] > '2') || - (tm->data[6] == '2' && tm->data[7] > '3') || - (tm->data[8] > '5')) { - LOG_DBG((LOG_POLICY, 30, - "x509_generate_kn: invalid value in " - "NotValidAfter time field")); - free(ikey); - free(skey); - free(buf); - return 0; - } - /* Stupid UTC tricks. */ - if (tm->data[0] < '5') - snprintf(after, sizeof after, "20%s", - tm->data); - else - snprintf(after, sizeof after, "19%s", - tm->data); - } else { /* V_ASN1_GENERICTIME */ - if ((tm->length < 12) || (tm->length > 15)) { - LOG_DBG((LOG_POLICY, 30, - "x509_generate_kn: invalid length of " - "NotValidAfter time field (%d)", - tm->length)); - free(ikey); - free(skey); - free(buf); - return 0; - } - /* Validity checks. */ - if ((tm->data[4] != '0' && tm->data[4] != '1') || - (tm->data[4] == '0' && tm->data[5] == '0') || - (tm->data[4] == '1' && tm->data[5] > '2') || - (tm->data[6] > '3') || - (tm->data[6] == '0' && tm->data[7] == '0') || - (tm->data[6] == '3' && tm->data[7] > '1') || - (tm->data[8] > '2') || - (tm->data[8] == '2' && tm->data[9] > '3') || - (tm->data[10] > '5')) { - LOG_DBG((LOG_POLICY, 30, - "x509_generate_kn: invalid value in " - "NotValidAfter time field")); - free(ikey); - free(skey); - free(buf); - return 0; - } - snprintf(after, sizeof after, "%s", tm->data); - } - - /* Fix missing seconds. */ - if (tm->length < 12) { - after[12] = '0'; - after[13] = '0'; - } - after[14] = '\0'; /* This will overwrite trailing 'Z' */ - } - - snprintf(buf, buf_len, fmt, skey, ikey, timecomp, before, timecomp2, - after); - free(ikey); - free(skey); - - if (kn_add_assertion(id, buf, strlen(buf), ASSERT_FLAG_LOCAL) == -1) { - LOG_DBG((LOG_POLICY, 30, - "x509_generate_kn: failed to add new KeyNote credential")); - free(buf); - return 0; - } - /* We could print the assertion here, but log_print() truncates... */ - LOG_DBG((LOG_POLICY, 60, "x509_generate_kn: added credential")); - - free(buf); - - if (!X509_NAME_oneline(issuer, isname, 256)) { - LOG_DBG((LOG_POLICY, 50, - "x509_generate_kn: " - "X509_NAME_oneline (issuer, ...) failed")); - return 0; - } - if (!X509_NAME_oneline(subject, subname, 256)) { - LOG_DBG((LOG_POLICY, 50, - "x509_generate_kn: " - "X509_NAME_oneline (subject, ...) failed")); - return 0; - } - buf_len = strlen(fmt2) + strlen(isname) + strlen(subname) + 56; - buf = malloc(buf_len); - if (!buf) { - log_error("x509_generate_kn: malloc (%d) failed", buf_len); - return 0; - } - snprintf(buf, buf_len, fmt2, isname, subname, timecomp, before, - timecomp2, after); - - if (kn_add_assertion(id, buf, strlen(buf), ASSERT_FLAG_LOCAL) == -1) { - LOG_DBG((LOG_POLICY, 30, - "x509_generate_kn: failed to add new KeyNote credential")); - free(buf); - return 0; - } - LOG_DBG((LOG_POLICY, 80, "x509_generate_kn: added credential:\n%s", - buf)); - - free(buf); - return 1; -} -#endif /* USE_POLICY */ - -static u_int16_t -x509_hash(u_int8_t *id, size_t len) -{ - u_int16_t bucket = 0; - size_t i; - - /* XXX We might resize if we are crossing a certain threshold. */ - for (i = 4; i < (len & ~1); i += 2) { - /* Doing it this way avoids alignment problems. */ - bucket ^= (id[i] + 1) * (id[i + 1] + 257); - } - /* Hash in the last character of odd length IDs too. */ - if (i < len) - bucket ^= (id[i] + 1) * (id[i] + 257); - - bucket &= bucket_mask; - return bucket; -} - -static void -x509_hash_init(void) -{ - struct x509_hash *certh; - int i; - - bucket_mask = (1 << INITIAL_BUCKET_BITS) - 1; - - /* If reinitializing, free existing entries. */ - if (x509_tab) { - for (i = 0; i <= bucket_mask; i++) - for (certh = LIST_FIRST(&x509_tab[i]); certh; - certh = LIST_FIRST(&x509_tab[i])) { - LIST_REMOVE(certh, link); - free(certh); - } - free(x509_tab); - } - x509_tab = malloc((bucket_mask + 1) * sizeof(struct x509_list)); - if (!x509_tab) - log_fatal("x509_hash_init: malloc (%lu) failed", - (bucket_mask + 1) * - (unsigned long)sizeof(struct x509_list)); - for (i = 0; i <= bucket_mask; i++) { - LIST_INIT(&x509_tab[i]); - } -} - -/* Lookup a certificate by an ID blob. */ -static X509 * -x509_hash_find(u_int8_t *id, size_t len) -{ - struct x509_hash *cert; - u_int8_t **cid; - u_int32_t *clen; - int n, i, id_found; - - for (cert = LIST_FIRST(&x509_tab[x509_hash(id, len)]); cert; - cert = LIST_NEXT(cert, link)) { - if (!x509_cert_get_subjects(cert->cert, &n, &cid, &clen)) - continue; - - id_found = 0; - for (i = 0; i < n; i++) { - LOG_DBG_BUF((LOG_CRYPTO, 70, "cert_cmp", id, len)); - LOG_DBG_BUF((LOG_CRYPTO, 70, "cert_cmp", cid[i], - clen[i])); - /* - * XXX This identity predicate needs to be - * understood. - */ - if (clen[i] == len && id[0] == cid[i][0] && - memcmp(id + 4, cid[i] + 4, len - 4) == 0) { - id_found++; - break; - } - } - cert_free_subjects(n, cid, clen); - if (!id_found) - continue; - - LOG_DBG((LOG_CRYPTO, 70, "x509_hash_find: return X509 %p", - cert->cert)); - return cert->cert; - } - - LOG_DBG((LOG_CRYPTO, 70, - "x509_hash_find: no certificate matched query")); - return 0; -} - -static int -x509_hash_enter(X509 *cert) -{ - u_int16_t bucket = 0; - u_int8_t **id; - u_int32_t *len; - struct x509_hash *certh; - int n, i; - - if (!x509_cert_get_subjects(cert, &n, &id, &len)) { - log_print("x509_hash_enter: cannot retrieve subjects"); - return 0; - } - for (i = 0; i < n; i++) { - certh = calloc(1, sizeof *certh); - if (!certh) { - cert_free_subjects(n, id, len); - log_error("x509_hash_enter: calloc (1, %lu) failed", - (unsigned long)sizeof *certh); - return 0; - } - certh->cert = cert; - - bucket = x509_hash(id[i], len[i]); - - LIST_INSERT_HEAD(&x509_tab[bucket], certh, link); - LOG_DBG((LOG_CRYPTO, 70, - "x509_hash_enter: cert %p added to bucket %d", - cert, bucket)); - } - cert_free_subjects(n, id, len); - - return 1; -} - -/* X509 Certificate Handling functions. */ - -int -x509_read_from_dir(X509_STORE *ctx, char *name, int hash) -{ - struct dirent *file; -#if defined (USE_PRIVSEP) - struct monitor_dirents *dir; -#else - DIR *dir; -#endif - FILE *certfp; - X509 *cert; - struct stat sb; - char fullname[PATH_MAX]; - int fd, off, size; - - if (strlen(name) >= sizeof fullname - 1) { - log_print("x509_read_from_dir: directory name too long"); - return 0; - } - LOG_DBG((LOG_CRYPTO, 40, "x509_read_from_dir: reading certs from %s", - name)); - - dir = monitor_opendir(name); - if (!dir) { - LOG_DBG((LOG_CRYPTO, 10, - "x509_read_from_dir: opendir (\"%s\") failed: %s", - name, strerror(errno))); - return 0; - } - strlcpy(fullname, name, sizeof fullname); - off = strlen(fullname); - size = sizeof fullname - off; - - while ((file = monitor_readdir(dir)) != NULL) { - strlcpy(fullname + off, file->d_name, size); - - if (file->d_type != DT_UNKNOWN) { - if (file->d_type != DT_REG && file->d_type != DT_LNK) - continue; - } - - LOG_DBG((LOG_CRYPTO, 60, - "x509_read_from_dir: reading certificate %s", - file->d_name)); - - if ((fd = monitor_open(fullname, O_RDONLY, 0)) == -1) { - log_error("x509_read_from_dir: monitor_open" - "(\"%s\", O_RDONLY, 0) failed", fullname); - continue; - } - - if (fstat(fd, &sb) == -1) { - log_error("x509_read_from_dir: fstat failed"); - close(fd); - continue; - } - - if (!(sb.st_mode & S_IFREG)) { - close(fd); - continue; - } - - if ((certfp = fdopen(fd, "r")) == NULL) { - log_error("x509_read_from_dir: fdopen failed"); - close(fd); - continue; - } - -#if SSLEAY_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x00904100L - cert = PEM_read_X509(certfp, NULL, NULL, NULL); -#else - cert = PEM_read_X509(certfp, NULL, NULL); -#endif - fclose(certfp); - - if (cert == NULL) { - log_print("x509_read_from_dir: PEM_read_bio_X509 " - "failed for %s", file->d_name); - continue; - } - if (!X509_STORE_add_cert(ctx, cert)) { - /* - * This is actually expected if we have several - * certificates only differing in subjectAltName, - * which is not an something that is strange. - * Consider multi-homed machines. - */ - LOG_DBG((LOG_CRYPTO, 50, - "x509_read_from_dir: X509_STORE_add_cert failed " - "for %s", file->d_name)); - } - if (hash) - if (!x509_hash_enter(cert)) - log_print("x509_read_from_dir: " - "x509_hash_enter (%s) failed", - file->d_name); - } - - monitor_closedir(dir); - - return 1; -} - -/* XXX share code with x509_read_from_dir() ? */ -int -x509_read_crls_from_dir(X509_STORE *ctx, char *name) -{ -#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x00907000L - struct dirent *file; -#if defined (USE_PRIVSEP) - struct monitor_dirents *dir; -#else - DIR *dir; -#endif - FILE *crlfp; - X509_CRL *crl; - struct stat sb; - char fullname[PATH_MAX]; - int fd, off, size; - - if (strlen(name) >= sizeof fullname - 1) { - log_print("x509_read_crls_from_dir: directory name too long"); - return 0; - } - LOG_DBG((LOG_CRYPTO, 40, "x509_read_crls_from_dir: reading CRLs " - "from %s", name)); - - dir = monitor_opendir(name); - if (!dir) { - LOG_DBG((LOG_CRYPTO, 10, "x509_read_crls_from_dir: opendir " - "(\"%s\") failed: %s", name, strerror(errno))); - return 0; - } - strlcpy(fullname, name, sizeof fullname); - off = strlen(fullname); - size = sizeof fullname - off; - - while ((file = monitor_readdir(dir)) != NULL) { - strlcpy(fullname + off, file->d_name, size); - - if (file->d_type != DT_UNKNOWN) { - if (file->d_type != DT_REG && file->d_type != DT_LNK) - continue; - } - - LOG_DBG((LOG_CRYPTO, 60, "x509_read_crls_from_dir: reading " - "CRL %s", file->d_name)); - - if ((fd = monitor_open(fullname, O_RDONLY, 0)) == -1) { - log_error("x509_read_crls_from_dir: monitor_open" - "(\"%s\", O_RDONLY, 0) failed", fullname); - continue; - } - - if (fstat(fd, &sb) == -1) { - log_error("x509_read_crls_from_dir: fstat failed"); - close(fd); - continue; - } - - if (!(sb.st_mode & S_IFREG)) { - close(fd); - continue; - } - - if ((crlfp = fdopen(fd, "r")) == NULL) { - log_error("x509_read_crls_from_dir: fdopen failed"); - close(fd); - continue; - } - - crl = PEM_read_X509_CRL(crlfp, NULL, NULL, NULL); - - fclose(crlfp); - - if (crl == NULL) { - log_print("x509_read_crls_from_dir: " - "PEM_read_X509_CRL failed for %s", - file->d_name); - continue; - } - if (!X509_STORE_add_crl(ctx, crl)) { - LOG_DBG((LOG_CRYPTO, 50, "x509_read_crls_from_dir: " - "X509_STORE_add_crl failed for %s", file->d_name)); - continue; - } - /* - * XXX This is to make x509_cert_validate set this (and - * XXX another) flag when validating certificates. Currently, - * XXX OpenSSL defaults to reject an otherwise valid - * XXX certificate (chain) if these flags are set but there - * XXX are no CRLs to check. The current workaround is to only - * XXX set the flags if we actually loaded some CRL data. - */ - X509_STORE_set_flags(ctx, X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK); - } - - monitor_closedir(dir); -#endif /* OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x00907000L */ - - return 1; -} - -/* Initialize our databases and load our own certificates. */ -int -x509_cert_init(void) -{ - char *dirname; - - x509_hash_init(); - - /* Process CA certificates we will trust. */ - dirname = conf_get_str("X509-certificates", "CA-directory"); - if (!dirname) { - log_print("x509_cert_init: no CA-directory"); - return 0; - } - /* Free if already initialized. */ - if (x509_cas) - X509_STORE_free(x509_cas); - - x509_cas = X509_STORE_new(); - if (!x509_cas) { - log_print("x509_cert_init: creating new X509_STORE failed"); - return 0; - } - if (!x509_read_from_dir(x509_cas, dirname, 0)) { - log_print("x509_cert_init: x509_read_from_dir failed"); - return 0; - } - /* Process client certificates we will accept. */ - dirname = conf_get_str("X509-certificates", "Cert-directory"); - if (!dirname) { - log_print("x509_cert_init: no Cert-directory"); - return 0; - } - /* Free if already initialized. */ - if (x509_certs) - X509_STORE_free(x509_certs); - - x509_certs = X509_STORE_new(); - if (!x509_certs) { - log_print("x509_cert_init: creating new X509_STORE failed"); - return 0; - } - if (!x509_read_from_dir(x509_certs, dirname, 1)) { - log_print("x509_cert_init: x509_read_from_dir failed"); - return 0; - } - return 1; -} - -int -x509_crl_init(void) -{ - /* - * XXX I'm not sure if the method to use CRLs in certificate validation - * is valid for OpenSSL versions prior to 0.9.7. For now, simply do not - * support it. - */ -#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x00907000L - char *dirname; - dirname = conf_get_str("X509-certificates", "CRL-directory"); - if (!dirname) { - log_print("x509_crl_init: no CRL-directory"); - return 0; - } - if (!x509_read_crls_from_dir(x509_cas, dirname)) { - LOG_DBG((LOG_MISC, 10, - "x509_crl_init: x509_read_crls_from_dir failed")); - return 0; - } -#else - LOG_DBG((LOG_CRYPTO, 10, "x509_crl_init: CRL support only " - "with OpenSSL v0.9.7 or later")); -#endif - - return 1; -} - -void * -x509_cert_get(u_int8_t *asn, u_int32_t len) -{ - return x509_from_asn(asn, len); -} - -int -x509_cert_validate(void *scert) -{ - X509_STORE_CTX csc; - X509_NAME *issuer, *subject; - X509 *cert = (X509 *) scert; - EVP_PKEY *key; - int res, err; - - /* - * Validate the peer certificate by checking with the CA certificates - * we trust. - */ - X509_STORE_CTX_init(&csc, x509_cas, cert, NULL); -#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x00907000L - /* XXX See comment in x509_read_crls_from_dir. */ -#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x00908000L - if (x509_cas->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK) { -#else - if (x509_cas->flags & X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK) { -#endif - X509_STORE_CTX_set_flags(&csc, X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK); - X509_STORE_CTX_set_flags(&csc, X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK_ALL); - } -#endif - res = X509_verify_cert(&csc); - err = csc.error; - X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(&csc); - - /* - * Return if validation succeeded or self-signed certs are not - * accepted. - * - * XXX X509_verify_cert seems to return -1 if the validation should be - * retried somehow. We take this as an error and give up. - */ - if (res > 0) - return 1; - else if (res < 0 || - (res == 0 && err != X509_V_ERR_DEPTH_ZERO_SELF_SIGNED_CERT)) { - if (err) - log_print("x509_cert_validate: %.100s", - X509_verify_cert_error_string(err)); - return 0; - } else if (!conf_get_str("X509-certificates", "Accept-self-signed")) { - if (err) - log_print("x509_cert_validate: %.100s", - X509_verify_cert_error_string(err)); - return 0; - } - issuer = X509_get_issuer_name(cert); - subject = X509_get_subject_name(cert); - - if (!issuer || !subject || X509_name_cmp(issuer, subject)) - return 0; - - key = X509_get_pubkey(cert); - if (!key) { - log_print("x509_cert_validate: could not get public key from " - "self-signed cert"); - return 0; - } - if (X509_verify(cert, key) == -1) { - log_print("x509_cert_validate: self-signed cert is bad"); - return 0; - } - return 1; -} - -int -x509_cert_insert(int id, void *scert) -{ - X509 *cert; - int res; - - cert = X509_dup((X509 *)scert); - if (!cert) { - log_print("x509_cert_insert: X509_dup failed"); - return 0; - } -#ifdef USE_POLICY - if (x509_generate_kn(id, cert) == 0) { - LOG_DBG((LOG_POLICY, 50, - "x509_cert_insert: x509_generate_kn failed")); - X509_free(cert); - return 0; - } -#endif /* USE_POLICY */ - - res = x509_hash_enter(cert); - if (!res) - X509_free(cert); - - return res; -} - -static struct x509_hash * -x509_hash_lookup(X509 *cert) -{ - struct x509_hash *certh; - int i; - - for (i = 0; i <= bucket_mask; i++) - for (certh = LIST_FIRST(&x509_tab[i]); certh; - certh = LIST_NEXT(certh, link)) - if (certh->cert == cert) - return certh; - return 0; -} - -void -x509_cert_free(void *cert) -{ - struct x509_hash *certh = x509_hash_lookup((X509 *) cert); - - if (certh) - LIST_REMOVE(certh, link); - X509_free((X509 *) cert); -} - -/* Validate the BER Encoding of a RDNSequence in the CERT_REQ payload. */ -int -x509_certreq_validate(u_int8_t *asn, u_int32_t len) -{ - int res = 1; -#if 0 - struct norm_type name = SEQOF("issuer", RDNSequence); - - if (!asn_template_clone(&name, 1) || - (asn = asn_decode_sequence(asn, len, &name)) == 0) { - log_print("x509_certreq_validate: can not decode 'acceptable " - "CA' info"); - res = 0; - } - asn_free(&name); -#endif - - /* XXX - not supported directly in SSL - later. */ - - return res; -} - -/* Decode the BER Encoding of a RDNSequence in the CERT_REQ payload. */ -void * -x509_certreq_decode(u_int8_t *asn, u_int32_t len) -{ -#if 0 - /* XXX This needs to be done later. */ - struct norm_type aca = SEQOF("aca", RDNSequence); - struct norm_type *tmp; - struct x509_aca naca, *ret; - - if (!asn_template_clone(&aca, 1) || - (asn = asn_decode_sequence(asn, len, &aca)) == 0) { - log_print("x509_certreq_decode: can not decode 'acceptable " - "CA' info"); - goto fail; - } - memset(&naca, 0, sizeof(naca)); - - tmp = asn_decompose("aca.RelativeDistinguishedName." - "AttributeValueAssertion", &aca); - if (!tmp) - goto fail; - x509_get_attribval(tmp, &naca.name1); - - tmp = asn_decompose("aca.RelativeDistinguishedName[1]" - ".AttributeValueAssertion", &aca); - if (tmp) - x509_get_attribval(tmp, &naca.name2); - - asn_free(&aca); - - ret = malloc(sizeof(struct x509_aca)); - if (ret) - memcpy(ret, &naca, sizeof(struct x509_aca)); - else { - log_error("x509_certreq_decode: malloc (%lu) failed", - (unsigned long) sizeof(struct x509_aca)); - x509_free_aca(&aca); - } - - return ret; - -fail: - asn_free(&aca); -#endif - return 0; -} - -void -x509_free_aca(void *blob) -{ - struct x509_aca *aca = blob; - - if (aca->name1.type) - free(aca->name1.type); - if (aca->name1.val) - free(aca->name1.val); - - if (aca->name2.type) - free(aca->name2.type); - if (aca->name2.val) - free(aca->name2.val); -} - -X509 * -x509_from_asn(u_char *asn, u_int len) -{ - BIO *certh; - X509 *scert = 0; - - certh = BIO_new(BIO_s_mem()); - if (!certh) { - log_error("x509_from_asn: BIO_new (BIO_s_mem ()) failed"); - return 0; - } - if (BIO_write(certh, asn, len) == -1) { - log_error("x509_from_asn: BIO_write failed\n"); - goto end; - } - scert = d2i_X509_bio(certh, NULL); - if (!scert) { - log_print("x509_from_asn: d2i_X509_bio failed\n"); - goto end; - } -end: - BIO_free(certh); - return scert; -} - -/* - * Obtain a certificate from an acceptable CA. - * XXX We don't check if the certificate we find is from an accepted CA. - */ -int -x509_cert_obtain(u_int8_t *id, size_t id_len, void *data, u_int8_t **cert, - u_int32_t *certlen) -{ - struct x509_aca *aca = data; - X509 *scert; - - if (aca) - LOG_DBG((LOG_CRYPTO, 60, "x509_cert_obtain: " - "acceptable certificate authorities here")); - - /* We need our ID to find a certificate. */ - if (!id) { - log_print("x509_cert_obtain: ID is missing"); - return 0; - } - scert = x509_hash_find(id, id_len); - if (!scert) - return 0; - - x509_serialize(scert, cert, certlen); - if (!*cert) - return 0; - return 1; -} - -/* Returns a pointer to the subjectAltName information of X509 certificate. */ -int -x509_cert_subjectaltname(X509 *scert, u_int8_t **altname, u_int32_t *len) -{ - X509_EXTENSION *subjectaltname; - u_int8_t *sandata; - int extpos, santype, sanlen; - - extpos = X509_get_ext_by_NID(scert, NID_subject_alt_name, -1); - if (extpos == -1) { - log_print("x509_cert_subjectaltname: " - "certificate does not contain subjectAltName"); - return 0; - } - subjectaltname = X509_get_ext(scert, extpos); - - if (!subjectaltname || !subjectaltname->value || - !subjectaltname->value->data || - subjectaltname->value->length < 4) { - log_print("x509_cert_subjectaltname: invalid " - "subjectaltname extension"); - return 0; - } - /* SSL does not handle unknown ASN stuff well, do it by hand. */ - sandata = subjectaltname->value->data; - santype = sandata[2] & 0x3f; - sanlen = sandata[3]; - sandata += 4; - - if (sanlen + 4 != subjectaltname->value->length) { - log_print("x509_cert_subjectaltname: subjectaltname invalid " - "length"); - return 0; - } - *len = sanlen; - *altname = sandata; - return santype; -} - -int -x509_cert_get_subjects(void *scert, int *cnt, u_int8_t ***id, - u_int32_t **id_len) -{ - X509 *cert = scert; - X509_NAME *subject; - int type; - u_int8_t *altname; - u_int32_t altlen; - u_int8_t *buf = 0; - unsigned char *ubuf; - int i; - - *id = 0; - *id_len = 0; - - /* - * XXX There can be a collection of subjectAltNames, but for now I - * only return the subjectName and a single subjectAltName, if - * present. - */ - type = x509_cert_subjectaltname(cert, &altname, &altlen); - if (!type) { - *cnt = 1; - altlen = 0; - } else - *cnt = 2; - - *id = calloc(*cnt, sizeof **id); - if (!*id) { - log_print("x509_cert_get_subject: malloc (%lu) failed", - *cnt * (unsigned long)sizeof **id); - goto fail; - } - *id_len = malloc(*cnt * sizeof **id_len); - if (!*id_len) { - log_print("x509_cert_get_subject: malloc (%lu) failed", - *cnt * (unsigned long)sizeof **id_len); - goto fail; - } - /* Stash the subjectName into the first slot. */ - subject = X509_get_subject_name(cert); - if (!subject) - goto fail; - - (*id_len)[0] = - ISAKMP_ID_DATA_OFF + i2d_X509_NAME(subject, NULL) - - ISAKMP_GEN_SZ; - (*id)[0] = malloc((*id_len)[0]); - if (!(*id)[0]) { - log_print("x509_cert_get_subject: malloc (%d) failed", - (*id_len)[0]); - goto fail; - } - SET_ISAKMP_ID_TYPE((*id)[0] - ISAKMP_GEN_SZ, IPSEC_ID_DER_ASN1_DN); - ubuf = (*id)[0] + ISAKMP_ID_DATA_OFF - ISAKMP_GEN_SZ; - i2d_X509_NAME(subject, &ubuf); - - if (altlen) { - /* Stash the subjectAltName into the second slot. */ - buf = malloc(altlen + ISAKMP_ID_DATA_OFF); - if (!buf) { - log_print("x509_cert_get_subject: malloc (%d) failed", - altlen + ISAKMP_ID_DATA_OFF); - goto fail; - } - switch (type) { - case X509v3_DNS_NAME: - SET_ISAKMP_ID_TYPE(buf, IPSEC_ID_FQDN); - break; - - case X509v3_RFC_NAME: - SET_ISAKMP_ID_TYPE(buf, IPSEC_ID_USER_FQDN); - break; - - case X509v3_IP_ADDR: - /* - * XXX I dislike the numeric constants, but I don't - * know what we should use otherwise. - */ - switch (altlen) { - case 4: - SET_ISAKMP_ID_TYPE(buf, IPSEC_ID_IPV4_ADDR); - break; - - case 16: - SET_ISAKMP_ID_TYPE(buf, IPSEC_ID_IPV6_ADDR); - break; - - default: - log_print("x509_cert_get_subject: invalid " - "subjectAltName IPaddress length %d ", - altlen); - goto fail; - } - break; - } - - SET_IPSEC_ID_PROTO(buf + ISAKMP_ID_DOI_DATA_OFF, 0); - SET_IPSEC_ID_PORT(buf + ISAKMP_ID_DOI_DATA_OFF, 0); - memcpy(buf + ISAKMP_ID_DATA_OFF, altname, altlen); - - (*id_len)[1] = ISAKMP_ID_DATA_OFF + altlen - ISAKMP_GEN_SZ; - (*id)[1] = malloc((*id_len)[1]); - if (!(*id)[1]) { - log_print("x509_cert_get_subject: malloc (%d) failed", - (*id_len)[1]); - goto fail; - } - memcpy((*id)[1], buf + ISAKMP_GEN_SZ, (*id_len)[1]); - - free(buf); - buf = 0; - } - return 1; - -fail: - for (i = 0; i < *cnt; i++) - if ((*id)[i]) - free((*id)[i]); - if (*id) - free(*id); - if (*id_len) - free(*id_len); - if (buf) - free(buf); - return 0; -} - -int -x509_cert_get_key(void *scert, void *keyp) -{ - X509 *cert = scert; - EVP_PKEY *key; - - key = X509_get_pubkey(cert); - - /* Check if we got the right key type. */ - if (key->type != EVP_PKEY_RSA) { - log_print("x509_cert_get_key: public key is not a RSA key"); - X509_free(cert); - return 0; - } - *(RSA **)keyp = RSAPublicKey_dup(key->pkey.rsa); - - return *(RSA **)keyp == NULL ? 0 : 1; -} - -void * -x509_cert_dup(void *scert) -{ - return X509_dup(scert); -} - -void -x509_serialize(void *scert, u_int8_t **data, u_int32_t *datalen) -{ - u_int8_t *p; - - *datalen = i2d_X509((X509 *)scert, NULL); - *data = p = malloc(*datalen); - if (!p) { - log_error("x509_serialize: malloc (%d) failed", *datalen); - return; - } - *datalen = i2d_X509((X509 *)scert, &p); -} - -/* From cert to printable */ -char * -x509_printable(void *cert) -{ - char *s; - u_int8_t *data; - u_int32_t datalen, i; - - x509_serialize(cert, &data, &datalen); - if (!data) - return 0; - - s = malloc(datalen * 2 + 1); - if (!s) { - free(data); - log_error("x509_printable: malloc (%d) failed", - datalen * 2 + 1); - return 0; - } - for (i = 0; i < datalen; i++) - snprintf(s + (2 * i), 2 * (datalen - i) + 1, "%02x", data[i]); - free(data); - return s; -} - -/* From printable to cert */ -void * -x509_from_printable(char *cert) -{ - u_int8_t *buf; - int plen, ret; - void *foo; - - plen = (strlen(cert) + 1) / 2; - buf = malloc(plen); - if (!buf) { - log_error("x509_from_printable: malloc (%d) failed", plen); - return 0; - } - ret = hex2raw(cert, buf, plen); - if (ret == -1) { - free(buf); - log_print("x509_from_printable: badly formatted cert"); - return 0; - } - foo = x509_cert_get(buf, plen); - free(buf); - if (!foo) - log_print("x509_from_printable: " - "could not retrieve certificate"); - return foo; -} - -char * -x509_DN_string(u_int8_t *asn1, size_t sz) -{ - X509_NAME *name; - u_int8_t *p = asn1; - char buf[256]; /* XXX Just a guess at a maximum length. */ - - name = d2i_X509_NAME(NULL, &p, sz); - if (!name) { - log_print("x509_DN_string: d2i_X509_NAME failed"); - return 0; - } - if (!X509_NAME_oneline(name, buf, sizeof buf - 1)) { - log_print("x509_DN_string: X509_NAME_oneline failed"); - X509_NAME_free(name); - return 0; - } - X509_NAME_free(name); - buf[sizeof buf - 1] = '\0'; - return strdup(buf); -} -#endif /* USE_X509 */ |