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Diffstat (limited to 'keyexchange/isakmpd-20041012/ike_aggressive.c')
| -rw-r--r-- | keyexchange/isakmpd-20041012/ike_aggressive.c | 184 |
1 files changed, 184 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/keyexchange/isakmpd-20041012/ike_aggressive.c b/keyexchange/isakmpd-20041012/ike_aggressive.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..48ec10f --- /dev/null +++ b/keyexchange/isakmpd-20041012/ike_aggressive.c @@ -0,0 +1,184 @@ +/* $OpenBSD: ike_aggressive.c,v 1.8 2004/07/29 08:54:08 ho Exp $ */ +/* $EOM: ike_aggressive.c,v 1.4 2000/01/31 22:33:45 niklas Exp $ */ + +/* + * Copyright (c) 1999 Niklas Hallqvist. All rights reserved. + * Copyright (c) 1999 Angelos D. Keromytis. All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES + * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. + * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, + * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT + * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, + * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY + * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT + * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF + * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +/* + * This code was written under funding by Ericsson Radio Systems. + */ + +#include <sys/types.h> +#include <netinet/in.h> +#include <stdlib.h> +#include <string.h> + +#include "sysdep.h" + +#include "attribute.h" +#include "conf.h" +#include "constants.h" +#include "crypto.h" +#include "dh.h" +#include "doi.h" +#include "exchange.h" +#include "hash.h" +#include "ike_auth.h" +#include "ike_aggressive.h" +#include "ike_phase_1.h" +#include "ipsec.h" +#include "ipsec_doi.h" +#include "isakmp.h" +#include "log.h" +#include "math_group.h" +#include "message.h" +#if defined (USE_NAT_TRAVERSAL) +#include "nat_traversal.h" +#endif +#include "prf.h" +#include "sa.h" +#include "transport.h" +#include "util.h" + +static int initiator_recv_SA_KE_NONCE_ID_AUTH(struct message *); +static int initiator_send_SA_KE_NONCE_ID(struct message *); +static int initiator_send_AUTH(struct message *); +static int responder_recv_SA_KE_NONCE_ID(struct message *); +static int responder_send_SA_KE_NONCE_ID_AUTH(struct message *); +static int responder_recv_AUTH(struct message *); + +int (*ike_aggressive_initiator[])(struct message *) = { + initiator_send_SA_KE_NONCE_ID, + initiator_recv_SA_KE_NONCE_ID_AUTH, + initiator_send_AUTH +}; + +int (*ike_aggressive_responder[])(struct message *) = { + responder_recv_SA_KE_NONCE_ID, + responder_send_SA_KE_NONCE_ID_AUTH, + responder_recv_AUTH +}; + +/* Offer a set of transforms to the responder in the MSG message. */ +static int +initiator_send_SA_KE_NONCE_ID(struct message *msg) +{ + if (ike_phase_1_initiator_send_SA(msg)) + return -1; + + if (ike_phase_1_initiator_send_KE_NONCE(msg)) + return -1; + + return ike_phase_1_send_ID(msg); +} + +/* Figure out what transform the responder chose. */ +static int +initiator_recv_SA_KE_NONCE_ID_AUTH(struct message *msg) +{ + if (ike_phase_1_initiator_recv_SA(msg)) + return -1; + + if (ike_phase_1_initiator_recv_KE_NONCE(msg)) + return -1; + + return ike_phase_1_recv_ID_AUTH(msg); +} + +static int +initiator_send_AUTH(struct message *msg) +{ + msg->exchange->flags |= EXCHANGE_FLAG_ENCRYPT; + + if (ike_phase_1_send_AUTH(msg)) + return -1; + + /* + * RFC 2407 4.6.3 says that, among others, INITIAL-CONTACT MUST NOT + * be sent in Aggressive Mode. This leaves us with the choice of + * doing it in an informational exchange of its own with no delivery + * guarantee or in the first Quick Mode, or not at all. + * draft-jenkins-ipsec-rekeying-01.txt has some text that requires + * INITIAL-CONTACT in phase 1, thus contradicting what we learned + * above. I will bring this up in the IPsec list. For now we don't + * do INITIAL-CONTACT at all when using aggressive mode. + */ + return 0; +} + +/* + * Accept a set of transforms offered by the initiator and chose one we can + * handle. Also accept initiator's public DH value, nonce and ID. + */ +static int +responder_recv_SA_KE_NONCE_ID(struct message *msg) +{ + if (ike_phase_1_responder_recv_SA(msg)) + return -1; + + if (ike_phase_1_recv_ID(msg)) + return -1; + + return ike_phase_1_recv_KE_NONCE(msg); +} + +/* + * Reply with the transform we chose. Send our public DH value and a nonce + * to the initiator. + */ +static int +responder_send_SA_KE_NONCE_ID_AUTH(struct message *msg) +{ + /* Add the SA payload with the transform that was chosen. */ + if (ike_phase_1_responder_send_SA(msg)) + return -1; + + /* XXX Should we really just use the initiator's nonce size? */ + if (ike_phase_1_send_KE_NONCE(msg, msg->exchange->nonce_i_len)) + return -1; + + if (ike_phase_1_post_exchange_KE_NONCE(msg)) + return -1; + + return ike_phase_1_responder_send_ID_AUTH(msg); +} + +/* + * Reply with the transform we chose. Send our public DH value and a nonce + * to the initiator. + */ +static int +responder_recv_AUTH(struct message *msg) +{ + if (ike_phase_1_recv_AUTH(msg)) + return -1; + +#if defined (USE_NAT_TRAVERSAL) + /* Aggressive: Check for NAT-D payloads and contents. */ + if (msg->exchange->flags & EXCHANGE_FLAG_NAT_T_CAP_PEER) + (void)nat_t_exchange_check_nat_d(msg); +#endif + return 0; +} |