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-$OpenBSD: QUESTIONS,v 1.5 2003/11/05 12:31:21 jmc Exp $
-$EOM: QUESTIONS,v 1.12 1998/10/11 17:11:06 niklas Exp $
-
-Does the spec limit the count of SA payloads in a message?  Where if so?
-[ Only the specific IKE main mode does.  In the IKE spec.]
-
-The message ID field of the header, can it be considered a SA identifier
-if used together with the cookiepair?	[Yes, it is meant to be that]
-
-DOI 0, what protocols are defined for it?  Where?
-
-Isn't this a potential DOS attack:
-Hostile user listens for ISAKMP traffic, and then extracts cookiepairs
-and message IDs which he uses to flood any of the peers with spoofed
-packets pretending to be the other one.  Most probably these packets will
-result in error notifications which potentially result in SA tear-down?
-Maybe should notifications never be issued for erroneous packets which
-cannot be authenticated?  Or should we not tear down SAs as results of
-notifications?
-
-Certicom claims to hold licenses for Elliptic Curve Cryptography? Does this
-concern us? See: http://grouper.ieee.org/groups/1363/P1363/patents.html
-
-Main mode when using public key encryption authentication does not look
-like an identity protection exchange to me.  Must I really get rid of
-the generic ISAKMP payload presense tests?
-
-IV generation is not described precisely in Appendix B of -oakley-08.txt:
-'Subsequent messages MUST use the last CBC encryption block from the previous
-message as their IV'. This probably means that we take the new IV from the
-last encrypted block of the last message we sent. The SSH testing site uses
-the last block from the last message they received. This is probably not
-what was meant and should be clarified on ipsec@tis.com.
-[ From what we have gathered this is what is meant.  ]