added keyexchange

1 files changed, 266 insertions, 0 deletions

diff --git a/keyexchange/isakmpd-20041012/sysdep/openbsd/sysdep.c b/keyexchange/isakmpd-20041012/sysdep/openbsd/sysdep.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..f59922f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/keyexchange/isakmpd-20041012/sysdep/openbsd/sysdep.c
@@ -0,0 +1,266 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: sysdep.c,v 1.28 2004/08/10 15:59:11 ho Exp $	 */
+/* $EOM: sysdep.c,v 1.9 2000/12/04 04:46:35 angelos Exp $	 */
+
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 1998, 1999 Niklas Hallqvist.  All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+/*
+ * This code was written under funding by Ericsson Radio Systems.
+ */
+
+#include <sys/errno.h>
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/socket.h>
+#include <netinet/in.h>
+#include <arpa/inet.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+
+#include "sysdep.h"
+
+#include "monitor.h"
+#include "util.h"
+
+#ifdef NEED_SYSDEP_APP
+#include "app.h"
+#include "conf.h"
+#include "ipsec.h"
+
+#ifdef USE_PF_KEY_V2
+#include "pf_key_v2.h"
+#define KEY_API(x) pf_key_v2_##x
+#endif
+
+#endif /* NEED_SYSDEP_APP */
+#include "log.h"
+
+extern char    *__progname;
+
+/*
+ * An as strong as possible random number generator, reverting to a
+ * deterministic pseudo-random one if regrand is set.
+ */
+u_int32_t
+sysdep_random()
+{
+	if (!regrand)
+		return arc4random();
+	else
+		return random();
+}
+
+/* Return the basename of the command used to invoke us.  */
+char *
+sysdep_progname()
+{
+	return __progname;
+}
+
+/* Return the length of the sockaddr struct.  */
+u_int8_t
+sysdep_sa_len(struct sockaddr *sa)
+{
+	return sa->sa_len;
+}
+
+/* As regress/ use this file I protect the sysdep_app_* stuff like this.  */
+#ifdef NEED_SYSDEP_APP
+/*
+ * Prepare the application we negotiate SAs for (i.e. the IPsec stack)
+ * for communication.  We return a file descriptor useable to select(2) on.
+ */
+int
+sysdep_app_open()
+{
+#ifdef USE_PRIVSEP
+	return monitor_pf_key_v2_open();
+#else
+	return KEY_API(open)();
+#endif
+}
+
+/*
+ * When select(2) has noticed our application needs attendance, this is what
+ * gets called.  FD is the file descriptor causing the alarm.
+ */
+void
+sysdep_app_handler(int fd)
+{
+	KEY_API(handler)(fd);
+}
+
+/* Check that the connection named NAME is active, or else make it active.  */
+void
+sysdep_connection_check(char *name)
+{
+	KEY_API(connection_check)(name);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Generate a SPI for protocol PROTO and the source/destination pair given by
+ * SRC, SRCLEN, DST & DSTLEN.  Stash the SPI size in SZ.
+ */
+u_int8_t *
+sysdep_ipsec_get_spi(size_t *sz, u_int8_t proto, struct sockaddr *src,
+    struct sockaddr *dst, u_int32_t seq)
+{
+	if (app_none) {
+		*sz = IPSEC_SPI_SIZE;
+		/* XXX should be random instead I think.  */
+		return (u_int8_t *)strdup("\x12\x34\x56\x78");
+	}
+	return KEY_API(get_spi)(sz, proto, src, dst, seq);
+}
+
+struct sa_kinfo *
+sysdep_ipsec_get_kernel_sa(u_int8_t *spi, size_t spi_sz, u_int8_t proto,
+    struct sockaddr *dst)
+{
+	if (app_none)
+		return 0;
+	return KEY_API(get_kernel_sa)(spi, spi_sz, proto, dst);
+}
+
+/* Force communication on socket FD to go in the clear.  */
+int
+sysdep_cleartext(int fd, int af)
+{
+	int level, sw;
+	struct {
+		int             ip_proto;	/* IP protocol */
+		int             auth_level;
+		int             esp_trans_level;
+		int             esp_network_level;
+		int             ipcomp_level;
+	} optsw[] = {
+	    {
+		IPPROTO_IP,
+		IP_AUTH_LEVEL,
+		IP_ESP_TRANS_LEVEL,
+		IP_ESP_NETWORK_LEVEL,
+#ifdef IP_IPCOMP_LEVEL
+		IP_IPCOMP_LEVEL
+#else
+		0
+#endif
+	    }, {
+		IPPROTO_IPV6,
+		IPV6_AUTH_LEVEL,
+		IPV6_ESP_TRANS_LEVEL,
+		IPV6_ESP_NETWORK_LEVEL,
+#ifdef IPV6_IPCOMP_LEVEL
+		IPV6_IPCOMP_LEVEL
+#else
+		0
+#endif
+	    },
+	};
+
+	if (app_none)
+		return 0;
+
+	switch (af) {
+	case AF_INET:
+		sw = 0;
+		break;
+	case AF_INET6:
+		sw = 1;
+		break;
+	default:
+		log_print("sysdep_cleartext: unsupported protocol family %d", af);
+		return -1;
+	}
+
+	/*
+         * Need to bypass system security policy, so I can send and
+         * receive key management datagrams in the clear.
+         */
+	level = IPSEC_LEVEL_BYPASS;
+	if (monitor_setsockopt(fd, optsw[sw].ip_proto, optsw[sw].auth_level,
+	    (char *) &level, sizeof level) == -1) {
+		log_error("sysdep_cleartext: "
+		    "setsockopt (%d, %d, IP_AUTH_LEVEL, ...) failed", fd,
+		    optsw[sw].ip_proto);
+		return -1;
+	}
+	if (monitor_setsockopt(fd, optsw[sw].ip_proto, optsw[sw].esp_trans_level,
+	    (char *) &level, sizeof level) == -1) {
+		log_error("sysdep_cleartext: "
+		    "setsockopt (%d, %d, IP_ESP_TRANS_LEVEL, ...) failed", fd,
+		    optsw[sw].ip_proto);
+		return -1;
+	}
+	if (monitor_setsockopt(fd, optsw[sw].ip_proto, optsw[sw].esp_network_level,
+	    (char *) &level, sizeof level) == -1) {
+		log_error("sysdep_cleartext: "
+		    "setsockopt (%d, %d, IP_ESP_NETWORK_LEVEL, ...) failed", fd,
+		    optsw[sw].ip_proto);
+		return -1;
+	}
+	if (optsw[sw].ipcomp_level &&
+	    monitor_setsockopt(fd, optsw[sw].ip_proto, optsw[sw].ipcomp_level,
+	    (char *) &level, sizeof level) == -1 &&
+	    errno != ENOPROTOOPT) {
+		log_error("sysdep_cleartext: "
+		    "setsockopt (%d, %d, IP_IPCOMP_LEVEL, ...) failed,", fd,
+		    optsw[sw].ip_proto);
+		return -1;
+	}
+	return 0;
+}
+
+int
+sysdep_ipsec_delete_spi(struct sa *sa, struct proto *proto, int incoming)
+{
+	if (app_none)
+		return 0;
+	return KEY_API(delete_spi)(sa, proto, incoming);
+}
+
+int
+sysdep_ipsec_enable_sa(struct sa *sa, struct sa *isakmp_sa)
+{
+	if (app_none)
+		return 0;
+	return KEY_API(enable_sa)(sa, isakmp_sa);
+}
+
+int
+sysdep_ipsec_group_spis(struct sa *sa, struct proto *proto1,
+    struct proto *proto2, int incoming)
+{
+	if (app_none)
+		return 0;
+	return KEY_API(group_spis)(sa, proto1, proto2, incoming);
+}
+
+int
+sysdep_ipsec_set_spi(struct sa *sa, struct proto *proto, int incoming,
+    struct sa *isakmp_sa)
+{
+	if (app_none)
+		return 0;
+	return KEY_API(set_spi) (sa,proto, incoming, isakmp_sa);
+}
+#endif