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authorOthmar Gsenger <otti@anytun.org>2007-07-30 19:37:53 +0000
committerOthmar Gsenger <otti@anytun.org>2007-07-30 19:37:53 +0000
commit6585e5ad764ee2414d9b01f30784b6549bc8f58e (patch)
tree4ea258d5327838363dc3ac66d09ecc94686f3e26 /keyexchange/isakmpd-20041012/ipsec.c
parentripe requests, final (diff)
added keyexchange
Diffstat (limited to 'keyexchange/isakmpd-20041012/ipsec.c')
-rw-r--r--keyexchange/isakmpd-20041012/ipsec.c2523
1 files changed, 2523 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/keyexchange/isakmpd-20041012/ipsec.c b/keyexchange/isakmpd-20041012/ipsec.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..46cb8d9
--- /dev/null
+++ b/keyexchange/isakmpd-20041012/ipsec.c
@@ -0,0 +1,2523 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: ipsec.c,v 1.104 2004/09/17 13:53:08 ho Exp $ */
+/* $EOM: ipsec.c,v 1.143 2000/12/11 23:57:42 niklas Exp $ */
+
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001 Niklas Hallqvist. All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (c) 2001 Angelos D. Keromytis. All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (c) 2001 Håkan Olsson. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+/*
+ * This code was written under funding by Ericsson Radio Systems.
+ */
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/socket.h>
+#include <netdb.h>
+#include <netinet/in.h>
+#include <arpa/inet.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+
+#include "sysdep.h"
+
+#include "attribute.h"
+#include "conf.h"
+#include "constants.h"
+#include "crypto.h"
+#include "dh.h"
+#include "doi.h"
+#if defined (USE_DPD)
+#include "dpd.h"
+#endif
+#include "exchange.h"
+#include "hash.h"
+#include "ike_aggressive.h"
+#include "ike_auth.h"
+#include "ike_main_mode.h"
+#include "ike_quick_mode.h"
+#include "ipsec.h"
+#include "ipsec_doi.h"
+#include "isakmp.h"
+#include "isakmp_cfg.h"
+#include "isakmp_fld.h"
+#include "isakmp_num.h"
+#include "log.h"
+#include "math_group.h"
+#include "message.h"
+#if defined (USE_NAT_TRAVERSAL)
+#include "nat_traversal.h"
+#endif
+#include "prf.h"
+#include "sa.h"
+#include "timer.h"
+#include "transport.h"
+#include "util.h"
+#ifdef USE_X509
+#include "x509.h"
+#endif
+
+extern int acquire_only;
+
+/* Backwards compatibility. */
+#ifndef NI_MAXHOST
+#define NI_MAXHOST 1025
+#endif
+
+/* The replay window size used for all IPsec protocols if not overridden. */
+#define DEFAULT_REPLAY_WINDOW 16
+
+struct ipsec_decode_arg {
+ struct message *msg;
+ struct sa *sa;
+ struct proto *proto;
+};
+
+/* These variables hold the contacted peers ADT state. */
+struct contact {
+ struct sockaddr *addr;
+ socklen_t len;
+} *contacts = 0;
+int contact_cnt = 0, contact_limit = 0;
+
+static int addr_cmp(const void *, const void *);
+static int ipsec_add_contact(struct message *);
+static int ipsec_contacted(struct message *);
+#ifdef USE_DEBUG
+static int ipsec_debug_attribute(u_int16_t, u_int8_t *, u_int16_t,
+ void *);
+#endif
+static void ipsec_delete_spi(struct sa *, struct proto *, int);
+static int16_t *ipsec_exchange_script(u_int8_t);
+static void ipsec_finalize_exchange(struct message *);
+static void ipsec_free_exchange_data(void *);
+static void ipsec_free_proto_data(void *);
+static void ipsec_free_sa_data(void *);
+static struct keystate *ipsec_get_keystate(struct message *);
+static u_int8_t *ipsec_get_spi(size_t *, u_int8_t, struct message *);
+static int ipsec_handle_leftover_payload(struct message *, u_int8_t,
+ struct payload *);
+static int ipsec_informational_post_hook(struct message *);
+static int ipsec_informational_pre_hook(struct message *);
+static int ipsec_initiator(struct message *);
+static void ipsec_proto_init(struct proto *, char *);
+static int ipsec_responder(struct message *);
+static void ipsec_setup_situation(u_int8_t *);
+static int ipsec_set_network(u_int8_t *, u_int8_t *, struct ipsec_sa *);
+static size_t ipsec_situation_size(void);
+static u_int8_t ipsec_spi_size(u_int8_t);
+static int ipsec_validate_attribute(u_int16_t, u_int8_t *, u_int16_t,
+ void *);
+static int ipsec_validate_exchange(u_int8_t);
+static int ipsec_validate_id_information(u_int8_t, u_int8_t *, u_int8_t *,
+ size_t, struct exchange *);
+static int ipsec_validate_key_information(u_int8_t *, size_t);
+static int ipsec_validate_notification(u_int16_t);
+static int ipsec_validate_proto(u_int8_t);
+static int ipsec_validate_situation(u_int8_t *, size_t *, size_t);
+static int ipsec_validate_transform_id(u_int8_t, u_int8_t);
+
+static struct doi ipsec_doi = {
+ {0}, IPSEC_DOI_IPSEC,
+ sizeof(struct ipsec_exch), sizeof(struct ipsec_sa),
+ sizeof(struct ipsec_proto),
+#ifdef USE_DEBUG
+ ipsec_debug_attribute,
+#endif
+ ipsec_delete_spi,
+ ipsec_exchange_script,
+ ipsec_finalize_exchange,
+ ipsec_free_exchange_data,
+ ipsec_free_proto_data,
+ ipsec_free_sa_data,
+ ipsec_get_keystate,
+ ipsec_get_spi,
+ ipsec_handle_leftover_payload,
+ ipsec_informational_post_hook,
+ ipsec_informational_pre_hook,
+ ipsec_is_attribute_incompatible,
+ ipsec_proto_init,
+ ipsec_setup_situation,
+ ipsec_situation_size,
+ ipsec_spi_size,
+ ipsec_validate_attribute,
+ ipsec_validate_exchange,
+ ipsec_validate_id_information,
+ ipsec_validate_key_information,
+ ipsec_validate_notification,
+ ipsec_validate_proto,
+ ipsec_validate_situation,
+ ipsec_validate_transform_id,
+ ipsec_initiator,
+ ipsec_responder,
+ ipsec_decode_ids
+};
+
+int16_t script_quick_mode[] = {
+ ISAKMP_PAYLOAD_HASH, /* Initiator -> responder. */
+ ISAKMP_PAYLOAD_SA,
+ ISAKMP_PAYLOAD_NONCE,
+ EXCHANGE_SCRIPT_SWITCH,
+ ISAKMP_PAYLOAD_HASH, /* Responder -> initiator. */
+ ISAKMP_PAYLOAD_SA,
+ ISAKMP_PAYLOAD_NONCE,
+ EXCHANGE_SCRIPT_SWITCH,
+ ISAKMP_PAYLOAD_HASH, /* Initiator -> responder. */
+ EXCHANGE_SCRIPT_END
+};
+
+int16_t script_new_group_mode[] = {
+ ISAKMP_PAYLOAD_HASH, /* Initiator -> responder. */
+ ISAKMP_PAYLOAD_SA,
+ EXCHANGE_SCRIPT_SWITCH,
+ ISAKMP_PAYLOAD_HASH, /* Responder -> initiator. */
+ ISAKMP_PAYLOAD_SA,
+ EXCHANGE_SCRIPT_END
+};
+
+struct dst_spi_proto_arg {
+ struct sockaddr *dst;
+ u_int32_t spi;
+ u_int8_t proto;
+};
+
+/*
+ * Check if SA matches what we are asking for through V_ARG. It has to
+ * be a finished phase 2 SA.
+ * if "proto" arg is 0, match any proto
+ */
+static int
+ipsec_sa_check(struct sa *sa, void *v_arg)
+{
+ struct dst_spi_proto_arg *arg = v_arg;
+ struct proto *proto;
+ struct sockaddr *dst, *src;
+ int incoming;
+
+ if (sa->phase != 2 || !(sa->flags & SA_FLAG_READY))
+ return 0;
+
+ sa->transport->vtbl->get_dst(sa->transport, &dst);
+ if (memcmp(sockaddr_addrdata(dst), sockaddr_addrdata(arg->dst),
+ sockaddr_addrlen(dst)) == 0)
+ incoming = 0;
+ else {
+ sa->transport->vtbl->get_src(sa->transport, &src);
+ if (memcmp(sockaddr_addrdata(src), sockaddr_addrdata(arg->dst),
+ sockaddr_addrlen(src)) == 0)
+ incoming = 1;
+ else
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ for (proto = TAILQ_FIRST(&sa->protos); proto;
+ proto = TAILQ_NEXT(proto, link))
+ if ((arg->proto == 0 || proto->proto == arg->proto) &&
+ memcmp(proto->spi[incoming], &arg->spi, sizeof arg->spi)
+ == 0)
+ return 1;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/* Find an SA with a "name" of DST, SPI & PROTO. */
+struct sa *
+ipsec_sa_lookup(struct sockaddr *dst, u_int32_t spi, u_int8_t proto)
+{
+ struct dst_spi_proto_arg arg;
+
+ arg.dst = dst;
+ arg.spi = spi;
+ arg.proto = proto;
+ return sa_find(ipsec_sa_check, &arg);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Check if SA matches the flow of another SA in V_ARG. It has to
+ * be a finished non-replaced phase 2 SA.
+ * XXX At some point other selectors will matter here too.
+ */
+static int
+ipsec_sa_check_flow(struct sa *sa, void *v_arg)
+{
+ struct sa *sa2 = v_arg;
+ struct ipsec_sa *isa = sa->data, *isa2 = sa2->data;
+
+ if (sa == sa2 || sa->phase != 2 ||
+ (sa->flags & (SA_FLAG_READY | SA_FLAG_REPLACED)) != SA_FLAG_READY)
+ return 0;
+
+ if (isa->tproto != isa2->tproto || isa->sport != isa2->sport ||
+ isa->dport != isa2->dport)
+ return 0;
+
+ return isa->src_net->sa_family == isa2->src_net->sa_family &&
+ memcmp(sockaddr_addrdata(isa->src_net),
+ sockaddr_addrdata(isa2->src_net),
+ sockaddr_addrlen(isa->src_net)) == 0 &&
+ memcmp(sockaddr_addrdata(isa->src_mask),
+ sockaddr_addrdata(isa2->src_mask),
+ sockaddr_addrlen(isa->src_mask)) == 0 &&
+ memcmp(sockaddr_addrdata(isa->dst_net),
+ sockaddr_addrdata(isa2->dst_net),
+ sockaddr_addrlen(isa->dst_net)) == 0 &&
+ memcmp(sockaddr_addrdata(isa->dst_mask),
+ sockaddr_addrdata(isa2->dst_mask),
+ sockaddr_addrlen(isa->dst_mask)) == 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Do IPsec DOI specific finalizations task for the exchange where MSG was
+ * the final message.
+ */
+static void
+ipsec_finalize_exchange(struct message *msg)
+{
+ struct sa *isakmp_sa = msg->isakmp_sa;
+ struct ipsec_sa *isa;
+ struct exchange *exchange = msg->exchange;
+ struct ipsec_exch *ie = exchange->data;
+ struct sa *sa = 0, *old_sa;
+ struct proto *proto, *last_proto = 0;
+#ifdef USE_DEBUG
+ char *addr1, *addr2, *mask1, *mask2;
+#endif
+
+ switch (exchange->phase) {
+ case 1:
+ switch (exchange->type) {
+ case ISAKMP_EXCH_ID_PROT:
+ case ISAKMP_EXCH_AGGRESSIVE:
+ isa = isakmp_sa->data;
+ isa->hash = ie->hash->type;
+ isa->prf_type = ie->prf_type;
+ isa->skeyid_len = ie->skeyid_len;
+ isa->skeyid_d = ie->skeyid_d;
+ isa->skeyid_a = ie->skeyid_a;
+ /* Prevents early free of SKEYID_*. */
+ ie->skeyid_a = ie->skeyid_d = 0;
+
+ /*
+ * If a lifetime was negotiated setup the expiration
+ * timers.
+ */
+ if (isakmp_sa->seconds)
+ sa_setup_expirations(isakmp_sa);
+
+#if defined (USE_NAT_TRAVERSAL)
+ if (isakmp_sa->flags & SA_FLAG_NAT_T_KEEPALIVE)
+ nat_t_setup_keepalive(isakmp_sa);
+#endif
+ break;
+ }
+ break;
+
+ case 2:
+ switch (exchange->type) {
+ case IKE_EXCH_QUICK_MODE:
+ /*
+ * Tell the application(s) about the SPIs and key
+ * material.
+ */
+ for (sa = TAILQ_FIRST(&exchange->sa_list); sa;
+ sa = TAILQ_NEXT(sa, next)) {
+ isa = sa->data;
+
+ if (exchange->initiator) {
+ /*
+ * Initiator is source, responder is
+ * destination.
+ */
+ if (ipsec_set_network(ie->id_ci,
+ ie->id_cr, isa)) {
+ log_print(
+ "ipsec_finalize_exchange: "
+ "ipsec_set_network "
+ "failed");
+ return;
+ }
+ } else {
+ /*
+ * Responder is source, initiator is
+ * destination.
+ */
+ if (ipsec_set_network(ie->id_cr,
+ ie->id_ci, isa)) {
+ log_print(
+ "ipsec_finalize_exchange: "
+ "ipsec_set_network "
+ "failed");
+ return;
+ }
+ }
+
+ for (proto = TAILQ_FIRST(&sa->protos),
+ last_proto = 0; proto;
+ proto = TAILQ_NEXT(proto, link)) {
+ if (sysdep_ipsec_set_spi(sa, proto,
+ 0, isakmp_sa) ||
+ (last_proto &&
+ sysdep_ipsec_group_spis(sa,
+ last_proto, proto, 0)) ||
+ sysdep_ipsec_set_spi(sa, proto,
+ 1, isakmp_sa) ||
+ (last_proto &&
+ sysdep_ipsec_group_spis(sa,
+ last_proto, proto, 1)))
+ /*
+ * XXX Tear down this
+ * exchange.
+ */
+ return;
+ last_proto = proto;
+ }
+
+#ifdef USE_DEBUG
+ if (sockaddr2text(isa->src_net, &addr1, 0))
+ addr1 = 0;
+ if (sockaddr2text(isa->src_mask, &mask1, 0))
+ mask1 = 0;
+ if (sockaddr2text(isa->dst_net, &addr2, 0))
+ addr2 = 0;
+ if (sockaddr2text(isa->dst_mask, &mask2, 0))
+ mask2 = 0;
+
+ LOG_DBG((LOG_EXCHANGE, 50,
+ "ipsec_finalize_exchange: src %s %s "
+ "dst %s %s tproto %u sport %u dport %u",
+ addr1 ? addr1 : "<??\?>",
+ mask1 ? mask1 : "<??\?>",
+ addr2 ? addr2 : "<??\?>",
+ mask2 ? mask2 : "<??\?>",
+ isa->tproto, ntohs(isa->sport),
+ ntohs(isa->dport)));
+
+ if (addr1)
+ free(addr1);
+ if (mask1)
+ free(mask1);
+ if (addr2)
+ free(addr2);
+ if (mask2)
+ free(mask2);
+
+#endif /* USE_DEBUG */
+
+ /*
+ * If this is not an SA acquired by the
+ * kernel, it needs to have a SPD entry
+ * (a.k.a. flow) set up.
+ */
+ if (!(sa->flags & SA_FLAG_ONDEMAND ||
+ conf_get_str("General", "Acquire-Only")
+ || acquire_only)
+ && sysdep_ipsec_enable_sa(sa, isakmp_sa))
+ /* XXX Tear down this exchange. */
+ return;
+
+ /*
+ * Mark elder SAs with the same flow
+ * information as replaced.
+ */
+ while ((old_sa = sa_find(ipsec_sa_check_flow,
+ sa)) != 0)
+ sa_mark_replaced(old_sa);
+ }
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+}
+
+/* Set the client addresses in ISA from SRC_ID and DST_ID. */
+static int
+ipsec_set_network(u_int8_t *src_id, u_int8_t *dst_id, struct ipsec_sa *isa)
+{
+ int id;
+
+ /* Set source address/mask. */
+ id = GET_ISAKMP_ID_TYPE(src_id);
+ switch (id) {
+ case IPSEC_ID_IPV4_ADDR:
+ case IPSEC_ID_IPV4_ADDR_SUBNET:
+ isa->src_net = (struct sockaddr *)calloc(1,
+ sizeof(struct sockaddr_in));
+ if (!isa->src_net)
+ goto memfail;
+ isa->src_net->sa_family = AF_INET;
+#ifndef USE_OLD_SOCKADDR
+ isa->src_net->sa_len = sizeof(struct sockaddr_in);
+#endif
+
+ isa->src_mask = (struct sockaddr *)calloc(1,
+ sizeof(struct sockaddr_in));
+ if (!isa->src_mask)
+ goto memfail;
+ isa->src_mask->sa_family = AF_INET;
+#ifndef USE_OLD_SOCKADDR
+ isa->src_mask->sa_len = sizeof(struct sockaddr_in);
+#endif
+ break;
+
+ case IPSEC_ID_IPV6_ADDR:
+ case IPSEC_ID_IPV6_ADDR_SUBNET:
+ isa->src_net = (struct sockaddr *)calloc(1,
+ sizeof(struct sockaddr_in6));
+ if (!isa->src_net)
+ goto memfail;
+ isa->src_net->sa_family = AF_INET6;
+#ifndef USE_OLD_SOCKADDR
+ isa->src_net->sa_len = sizeof(struct sockaddr_in6);
+#endif
+
+ isa->src_mask = (struct sockaddr *)calloc(1,
+ sizeof(struct sockaddr_in6));
+ if (!isa->src_mask)
+ goto memfail;
+ isa->src_mask->sa_family = AF_INET6;
+#ifndef USE_OLD_SOCKADDR
+ isa->src_mask->sa_len = sizeof(struct sockaddr_in6);
+#endif
+ break;
+
+ case IPSEC_ID_IPV4_RANGE:
+ case IPSEC_ID_IPV6_RANGE:
+ case IPSEC_ID_DER_ASN1_DN:
+ case IPSEC_ID_DER_ASN1_GN:
+ case IPSEC_ID_KEY_ID:
+ default:
+ log_print("ipsec_set_network: ID type %d (%s) not supported",
+ id, constant_name(ipsec_id_cst, id));
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ /* Net */
+ memcpy(sockaddr_addrdata(isa->src_net), src_id + ISAKMP_ID_DATA_OFF,
+ sockaddr_addrlen(isa->src_net));
+
+ /* Mask */
+ switch (id) {
+ case IPSEC_ID_IPV4_ADDR:
+ case IPSEC_ID_IPV6_ADDR:
+ memset(sockaddr_addrdata(isa->src_mask), 0xff,
+ sockaddr_addrlen(isa->src_mask));
+ break;
+ case IPSEC_ID_IPV4_ADDR_SUBNET:
+ case IPSEC_ID_IPV6_ADDR_SUBNET:
+ memcpy(sockaddr_addrdata(isa->src_mask), src_id +
+ ISAKMP_ID_DATA_OFF + sockaddr_addrlen(isa->src_net),
+ sockaddr_addrlen(isa->src_mask));
+ break;
+ }
+
+ memcpy(&isa->sport,
+ src_id + ISAKMP_ID_DOI_DATA_OFF + IPSEC_ID_PORT_OFF,
+ IPSEC_ID_PORT_LEN);
+
+ /* Set destination address. */
+ id = GET_ISAKMP_ID_TYPE(dst_id);
+ switch (id) {
+ case IPSEC_ID_IPV4_ADDR:
+ case IPSEC_ID_IPV4_ADDR_SUBNET:
+ isa->dst_net = (struct sockaddr *)calloc(1,
+ sizeof(struct sockaddr_in));
+ if (!isa->dst_net)
+ goto memfail;
+ isa->dst_net->sa_family = AF_INET;
+#ifndef USE_OLD_SOCKADDR
+ isa->dst_net->sa_len = sizeof(struct sockaddr_in);
+#endif
+
+ isa->dst_mask = (struct sockaddr *)calloc(1,
+ sizeof(struct sockaddr_in));
+ if (!isa->dst_mask)
+ goto memfail;
+ isa->dst_mask->sa_family = AF_INET;
+#ifndef USE_OLD_SOCKADDR
+ isa->dst_mask->sa_len = sizeof(struct sockaddr_in);
+#endif
+ break;
+
+ case IPSEC_ID_IPV6_ADDR:
+ case IPSEC_ID_IPV6_ADDR_SUBNET:
+ isa->dst_net = (struct sockaddr *)calloc(1,
+ sizeof(struct sockaddr_in6));
+ if (!isa->dst_net)
+ goto memfail;
+ isa->dst_net->sa_family = AF_INET6;
+#ifndef USE_OLD_SOCKADDR
+ isa->dst_net->sa_len = sizeof(struct sockaddr_in6);
+#endif
+
+ isa->dst_mask = (struct sockaddr *)calloc(1,
+ sizeof(struct sockaddr_in6));
+ if (!isa->dst_mask)
+ goto memfail;
+ isa->dst_mask->sa_family = AF_INET6;
+#ifndef USE_OLD_SOCKADDR
+ isa->dst_mask->sa_len = sizeof(struct sockaddr_in6);
+#endif
+ break;
+ }
+
+ /* Net */
+ memcpy(sockaddr_addrdata(isa->dst_net), dst_id + ISAKMP_ID_DATA_OFF,
+ sockaddr_addrlen(isa->dst_net));
+
+ /* Mask */
+ switch (id) {
+ case IPSEC_ID_IPV4_ADDR:
+ case IPSEC_ID_IPV6_ADDR:
+ memset(sockaddr_addrdata(isa->dst_mask), 0xff,
+ sockaddr_addrlen(isa->dst_mask));
+ break;
+ case IPSEC_ID_IPV4_ADDR_SUBNET:
+ case IPSEC_ID_IPV6_ADDR_SUBNET:
+ memcpy(sockaddr_addrdata(isa->dst_mask), dst_id +
+ ISAKMP_ID_DATA_OFF + sockaddr_addrlen(isa->dst_net),
+ sockaddr_addrlen(isa->dst_mask));
+ break;
+ }
+
+ memcpy(&isa->tproto, dst_id + ISAKMP_ID_DOI_DATA_OFF +
+ IPSEC_ID_PROTO_OFF, IPSEC_ID_PROTO_LEN);
+ memcpy(&isa->dport,
+ dst_id + ISAKMP_ID_DOI_DATA_OFF + IPSEC_ID_PORT_OFF,
+ IPSEC_ID_PORT_LEN);
+ return 0;
+
+memfail:
+ log_error("ipsec_set_network: calloc () failed");
+ return -1;
+}
+
+/* Free the DOI-specific exchange data pointed to by VIE. */
+static void
+ipsec_free_exchange_data(void *vie)
+{
+ struct ipsec_exch *ie = vie;
+#ifdef USE_ISAKMP_CFG
+ struct isakmp_cfg_attr *attr;
+#endif
+
+ if (ie->sa_i_b)
+ free(ie->sa_i_b);
+ if (ie->id_ci)
+ free(ie->id_ci);
+ if (ie->id_cr)
+ free(ie->id_cr);
+ if (ie->g_xi)
+ free(ie->g_xi);
+ if (ie->g_xr)
+ free(ie->g_xr);
+ if (ie->g_xy)
+ free(ie->g_xy);
+ if (ie->skeyid)
+ free(ie->skeyid);
+ if (ie->skeyid_d)
+ free(ie->skeyid_d);
+ if (ie->skeyid_a)
+ free(ie->skeyid_a);
+ if (ie->skeyid_e)
+ free(ie->skeyid_e);
+ if (ie->hash_i)
+ free(ie->hash_i);
+ if (ie->hash_r)
+ free(ie->hash_r);
+ if (ie->group)
+ group_free(ie->group);
+#ifdef USE_ISAKMP_CFG
+ for (attr = LIST_FIRST(&ie->attrs); attr;
+ attr = LIST_FIRST(&ie->attrs)) {
+ LIST_REMOVE(attr, link);
+ if (attr->length)
+ free(attr->value);
+ free(attr);
+ }
+#endif
+}
+
+/* Free the DOI-specific SA data pointed to by VISA. */
+static void
+ipsec_free_sa_data(void *visa)
+{
+ struct ipsec_sa *isa = visa;
+
+ if (isa->src_net)
+ free(isa->src_net);
+ if (isa->src_mask)
+ free(isa->src_mask);
+ if (isa->dst_net)
+ free(isa->dst_net);
+ if (isa->dst_mask)
+ free(isa->dst_mask);
+ if (isa->skeyid_a)
+ free(isa->skeyid_a);
+ if (isa->skeyid_d)
+ free(isa->skeyid_d);
+}
+
+/* Free the DOI-specific protocol data of an SA pointed to by VIPROTO. */
+static void
+ipsec_free_proto_data(void *viproto)
+{
+ struct ipsec_proto *iproto = viproto;
+ int i;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < 2; i++)
+ if (iproto->keymat[i])
+ free(iproto->keymat[i]);
+}
+
+/* Return exchange script based on TYPE. */
+static int16_t *
+ipsec_exchange_script(u_int8_t type)
+{
+ switch (type) {
+#ifdef USE_ISAKMP_CFG
+ case ISAKMP_EXCH_TRANSACTION:
+ return script_transaction;
+#endif
+ case IKE_EXCH_QUICK_MODE:
+ return script_quick_mode;
+ case IKE_EXCH_NEW_GROUP_MODE:
+ return script_new_group_mode;
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/* Initialize this DOI, requires doi_init to already have been called. */
+void
+ipsec_init(void)
+{
+ doi_register(&ipsec_doi);
+}
+
+/* Given a message MSG, return a suitable IV (or rather keystate). */
+static struct keystate *
+ipsec_get_keystate(struct message *msg)
+{
+ struct keystate *ks;
+ struct hash *hash;
+
+ /* If we have already have an IV, use it. */
+ if (msg->exchange && msg->exchange->keystate) {
+ ks = malloc(sizeof *ks);
+ if (!ks) {
+ log_error("ipsec_get_keystate: malloc (%lu) failed",
+ (unsigned long) sizeof *ks);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ memcpy(ks, msg->exchange->keystate, sizeof *ks);
+ return ks;
+ }
+ /*
+ * For phase 2 when no SA yet is setup we need to hash the IV used by
+ * the ISAKMP SA concatenated with the message ID, and use that as an
+ * IV for further cryptographic operations.
+ */
+ if (!msg->isakmp_sa->keystate) {
+ log_print("ipsec_get_keystate: no keystate in ISAKMP SA %p",
+ msg->isakmp_sa);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ ks = crypto_clone_keystate(msg->isakmp_sa->keystate);
+ if (!ks)
+ return 0;
+
+ hash = hash_get(((struct ipsec_sa *)msg->isakmp_sa->data)->hash);
+ hash->Init(hash->ctx);
+ LOG_DBG_BUF((LOG_CRYPTO, 80, "ipsec_get_keystate: final phase 1 IV",
+ ks->riv, ks->xf->blocksize));
+ hash->Update(hash->ctx, ks->riv, ks->xf->blocksize);
+ LOG_DBG_BUF((LOG_CRYPTO, 80, "ipsec_get_keystate: message ID",
+ ((u_int8_t *) msg->iov[0].iov_base) + ISAKMP_HDR_MESSAGE_ID_OFF,
+ ISAKMP_HDR_MESSAGE_ID_LEN));
+ hash->Update(hash->ctx, ((u_int8_t *) msg->iov[0].iov_base) +
+ ISAKMP_HDR_MESSAGE_ID_OFF, ISAKMP_HDR_MESSAGE_ID_LEN);
+ hash->Final(hash->digest, hash->ctx);
+ crypto_init_iv(ks, hash->digest, ks->xf->blocksize);
+ LOG_DBG_BUF((LOG_CRYPTO, 80, "ipsec_get_keystate: phase 2 IV",
+ hash->digest, ks->xf->blocksize));
+ return ks;
+}
+
+static void
+ipsec_setup_situation(u_int8_t *buf)
+{
+ SET_IPSEC_SIT_SIT(buf + ISAKMP_SA_SIT_OFF, IPSEC_SIT_IDENTITY_ONLY);
+}
+
+static size_t
+ipsec_situation_size(void)
+{
+ return IPSEC_SIT_SIT_LEN;
+}
+
+static u_int8_t
+ipsec_spi_size(u_int8_t proto)
+{
+ return IPSEC_SPI_SIZE;
+}
+
+static int
+ipsec_validate_attribute(u_int16_t type, u_int8_t * value, u_int16_t len,
+ void *vmsg)
+{
+ struct message *msg = vmsg;
+
+ if ((msg->exchange->phase == 1
+ && (type < IKE_ATTR_ENCRYPTION_ALGORITHM
+ || type > IKE_ATTR_GROUP_ORDER))
+ || (msg->exchange->phase == 2
+ && (type < IPSEC_ATTR_SA_LIFE_TYPE
+ || type > IPSEC_ATTR_ECN_TUNNEL)))
+ return -1;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int
+ipsec_validate_exchange(u_int8_t exch)
+{
+ return exch != IKE_EXCH_QUICK_MODE && exch != IKE_EXCH_NEW_GROUP_MODE;
+}
+
+static int
+ipsec_validate_id_information(u_int8_t type, u_int8_t *extra, u_int8_t *buf,
+ size_t sz, struct exchange *exchange)
+{
+ u_int8_t proto = GET_IPSEC_ID_PROTO(extra);
+ u_int16_t port = GET_IPSEC_ID_PORT(extra);
+
+ LOG_DBG((LOG_MESSAGE, 40,
+ "ipsec_validate_id_information: proto %d port %d type %d",
+ proto, port, type));
+ if (type < IPSEC_ID_IPV4_ADDR || type > IPSEC_ID_KEY_ID)
+ return -1;
+
+ switch (type) {
+ case IPSEC_ID_IPV4_ADDR:
+ LOG_DBG_BUF((LOG_MESSAGE, 40,
+ "ipsec_validate_id_information: IPv4", buf,
+ sizeof(struct in_addr)));
+ break;
+
+ case IPSEC_ID_IPV6_ADDR:
+ LOG_DBG_BUF((LOG_MESSAGE, 40,
+ "ipsec_validate_id_information: IPv6", buf,
+ sizeof(struct in6_addr)));
+ break;
+
+ case IPSEC_ID_IPV4_ADDR_SUBNET:
+ LOG_DBG_BUF((LOG_MESSAGE, 40,
+ "ipsec_validate_id_information: IPv4 network/netmask",
+ buf, 2 * sizeof(struct in_addr)));
+ break;
+
+ case IPSEC_ID_IPV6_ADDR_SUBNET:
+ LOG_DBG_BUF((LOG_MESSAGE, 40,
+ "ipsec_validate_id_information: IPv6 network/netmask",
+ buf, 2 * sizeof(struct in6_addr)));
+ break;
+
+ default:
+ break;
+ }
+
+ if (exchange->phase == 1
+ && (proto != IPPROTO_UDP || port != UDP_DEFAULT_PORT)
+ && (proto != 0 || port != 0)) {
+ /*
+ * XXX SSH's ISAKMP tester fails this test (proto 17 - port
+ * 0).
+ */
+#ifdef notyet
+ return -1;
+#else
+ log_print("ipsec_validate_id_information: dubious ID "
+ "information accepted");
+#endif
+ }
+ /* XXX More checks? */
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int
+ipsec_validate_key_information(u_int8_t *buf, size_t sz)
+{
+ /* XXX Not implemented yet. */
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int
+ipsec_validate_notification(u_int16_t type)
+{
+ return type < IPSEC_NOTIFY_RESPONDER_LIFETIME
+ || type > IPSEC_NOTIFY_INITIAL_CONTACT ? -1 : 0;
+}
+
+static int
+ipsec_validate_proto(u_int8_t proto)
+{
+ return proto < IPSEC_PROTO_IPSEC_AH
+ || proto > IPSEC_PROTO_IPCOMP ? -1 : 0;
+}
+
+static int
+ipsec_validate_situation(u_int8_t *buf, size_t *sz, size_t len)
+{
+ if (len < IPSEC_SIT_SIT_OFF + IPSEC_SIT_SIT_LEN) {
+ log_print("ipsec_validate_situation: payload too short: %u",
+ (unsigned int) len);
+ return -1;
+ }
+ /* Currently only "identity only" situations are supported. */
+ if (GET_IPSEC_SIT_SIT(buf) != IPSEC_SIT_IDENTITY_ONLY)
+ return 1;
+
+ *sz = IPSEC_SIT_SIT_LEN;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int
+ipsec_validate_transform_id(u_int8_t proto, u_int8_t transform_id)
+{
+ switch (proto) {
+ /*
+ * As no unexpected protocols can occur, we just tie the
+ * default case to the first case, in orer to silence a GCC
+ * warning.
+ */
+ default:
+ case ISAKMP_PROTO_ISAKMP:
+ return transform_id != IPSEC_TRANSFORM_KEY_IKE;
+ case IPSEC_PROTO_IPSEC_AH:
+ return transform_id < IPSEC_AH_MD5
+ || transform_id > IPSEC_AH_DES ? -1 : 0;
+ case IPSEC_PROTO_IPSEC_ESP:
+ return transform_id < IPSEC_ESP_DES_IV64
+ || (transform_id > IPSEC_ESP_AES_128_CTR
+ && transform_id < IPSEC_ESP_AES_MARS)
+ || transform_id > IPSEC_ESP_AES_TWOFISH ? -1 : 0;
+ case IPSEC_PROTO_IPCOMP:
+ return transform_id < IPSEC_IPCOMP_OUI
+ || transform_id > IPSEC_IPCOMP_V42BIS ? -1 : 0;
+ }
+}
+
+static int
+ipsec_initiator(struct message *msg)
+{
+ struct exchange *exchange = msg->exchange;
+ int (**script)(struct message *) = 0;
+
+ /* Check that the SA is coherent with the IKE rules. */
+ if (exchange->type != ISAKMP_EXCH_TRANSACTION
+ && ((exchange->phase == 1 &&
+ exchange->type != ISAKMP_EXCH_ID_PROT &&
+ exchange->type != ISAKMP_EXCH_AGGRESSIVE &&
+ exchange->type != ISAKMP_EXCH_INFO)
+ || (exchange->phase == 2 &&
+ exchange->type != IKE_EXCH_QUICK_MODE &&
+ exchange->type != ISAKMP_EXCH_INFO))) {
+ log_print("ipsec_initiator: unsupported exchange type %d "
+ "in phase %d", exchange->type, exchange->phase);
+ return -1;
+ }
+ switch (exchange->type) {
+ case ISAKMP_EXCH_ID_PROT:
+ script = ike_main_mode_initiator;
+ break;
+#ifdef USE_AGGRESSIVE
+ case ISAKMP_EXCH_AGGRESSIVE:
+ script = ike_aggressive_initiator;
+ break;
+#endif
+#ifdef USE_ISAKMP_CFG
+ case ISAKMP_EXCH_TRANSACTION:
+ script = isakmp_cfg_initiator;
+ break;
+#endif
+ case ISAKMP_EXCH_INFO:
+ return message_send_info(msg);
+ case IKE_EXCH_QUICK_MODE:
+ script = ike_quick_mode_initiator;
+ break;
+ default:
+ log_print("ipsec_initiator: unsupported exchange type %d",
+ exchange->type);
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ /* Run the script code for this step. */
+ if (script)
+ return script[exchange->step] (msg);
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * delete all SA's from addr with the associated proto and SPI's
+ *
+ * spis[] is an array of SPIs of size 16-octet for proto ISAKMP
+ * or 4-octet otherwise.
+ */
+static void
+ipsec_delete_spi_list(struct sockaddr *addr, u_int8_t proto, u_int8_t *spis,
+ int nspis, char *type)
+{
+ struct sa *sa;
+ int i;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < nspis; i++) {
+ if (proto == ISAKMP_PROTO_ISAKMP) {
+ u_int8_t *spi = spis + i * ISAKMP_HDR_COOKIES_LEN;
+
+ /*
+ * This really shouldn't happen in IPSEC DOI
+ * code, but Cisco VPN 3000 sends ISAKMP DELETE's
+ * this way.
+ */
+ sa = sa_lookup_isakmp_sa(addr, spi);
+ } else {
+ u_int32_t spi = ((u_int32_t *)spis)[i];
+
+ sa = ipsec_sa_lookup(addr, spi, proto);
+ }
+
+ if (sa == NULL) {
+ LOG_DBG((LOG_SA, 30, "ipsec_delete_spi_list: could "
+ "not locate SA (SPI %08x, proto %u)",
+ ((u_int32_t *)spis)[i], proto));
+ continue;
+ }
+ /* Delete the SA and search for the next */
+ LOG_DBG((LOG_SA, 30, "ipsec_delete_spi_list: "
+ "%s made us delete SA %p (%d references) for proto %d",
+ type, sa, sa->refcnt, proto));
+
+ sa_free(sa);
+ }
+}
+
+/*
+ * deal with a NOTIFY of INVALID_SPI
+ */
+static void
+ipsec_invalid_spi (struct message *msg, struct payload *p)
+{
+ struct sockaddr *dst;
+ int invspisz, off;
+ u_int32_t spi;
+ u_int16_t totsiz;
+ u_int8_t spisz;
+
+ /* Any notification that make us do something should be protected */
+ if(!TAILQ_FIRST (&msg->payload[ISAKMP_PAYLOAD_HASH]))
+ {
+ LOG_DBG ((LOG_SA, 40,
+ "ipsec_invalid_spi: missing HASH payload in INVALID_SPI"
+ " notification"));
+ return;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * get the invalid spi out of the variable sized notification data
+ * field, which is after the variable sized SPI field [which specifies
+ * the receiving entity's phase-1 SPI, not the invalid spi]
+ */
+ totsiz = GET_ISAKMP_GEN_LENGTH (p->p);
+ spisz = GET_ISAKMP_NOTIFY_SPI_SZ (p->p);
+ off = ISAKMP_NOTIFY_SPI_OFF + spisz;
+ invspisz = totsiz - off;
+
+ if (invspisz != sizeof spi)
+ {
+ LOG_DBG ((LOG_SA, 40,
+ "ipsec_invalid_spi: SPI size %d in INVALID_SPI "
+ "payload unsupported", spisz));
+ return;
+ }
+ memcpy (&spi, p->p + off, sizeof spi);
+
+ msg->transport->vtbl->get_dst (msg->transport, &dst);
+
+ /* delete matching SPI's from this peer */
+ ipsec_delete_spi_list (dst, 0, (u_int8_t *)&spi, 1, "INVALID_SPI");
+}
+
+static int
+ipsec_responder(struct message *msg)
+{
+ struct exchange *exchange = msg->exchange;
+ int (**script)(struct message *) = 0;
+ struct payload *p;
+ u_int16_t type;
+
+ /* Check that a new exchange is coherent with the IKE rules. */
+ if (exchange->step == 0 && exchange->type != ISAKMP_EXCH_TRANSACTION
+ && ((exchange->phase == 1 &&
+ exchange->type != ISAKMP_EXCH_ID_PROT &&
+ exchange->type != ISAKMP_EXCH_AGGRESSIVE &&
+ exchange->type != ISAKMP_EXCH_INFO)
+ || (exchange->phase == 2 &&
+ exchange->type != IKE_EXCH_QUICK_MODE &&
+ exchange->type != ISAKMP_EXCH_INFO))) {
+ message_drop(msg, ISAKMP_NOTIFY_UNSUPPORTED_EXCHANGE_TYPE,
+ 0, 1, 0);
+ return -1;
+ }
+ LOG_DBG((LOG_MISC, 30, "ipsec_responder: phase %d exchange %d step %d",
+ exchange->phase, exchange->type, exchange->step));
+ switch (exchange->type) {
+ case ISAKMP_EXCH_ID_PROT:
+ script = ike_main_mode_responder;
+ break;
+#ifdef USE_AGGRESSIVE
+ case ISAKMP_EXCH_AGGRESSIVE:
+ script = ike_aggressive_responder;
+ break;
+#endif
+#ifdef USE_ISAKMP_CFG
+ case ISAKMP_EXCH_TRANSACTION:
+ script = isakmp_cfg_responder;
+ break;
+#endif
+ case ISAKMP_EXCH_INFO:
+ for (p = payload_first(msg, ISAKMP_PAYLOAD_NOTIFY); p;
+ p = TAILQ_NEXT(p, link)) {
+ type = GET_ISAKMP_NOTIFY_MSG_TYPE(p->p);
+ LOG_DBG((LOG_EXCHANGE, 10,
+ "ipsec_responder: got NOTIFY of type %s",
+ constant_name(isakmp_notify_cst, type)));
+
+ switch (type) {
+ case IPSEC_NOTIFY_INITIAL_CONTACT:
+ /* Handled by leftover logic. */
+ break;
+
+#if defined (USE_DPD)
+ case ISAKMP_NOTIFY_STATUS_DPD_R_U_THERE:
+ case ISAKMP_NOTIFY_STATUS_DPD_R_U_THERE_ACK:
+ dpd_handle_notify(msg, p);
+ break;
+#endif
+
+ default:
+ p->flags |= PL_MARK;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * If any DELETEs are in here, let the logic of leftover
+ * payloads deal with them.
+ */
+ return 0;
+
+ case IKE_EXCH_QUICK_MODE:
+ script = ike_quick_mode_responder;
+ break;
+
+ default:
+ message_drop(msg, ISAKMP_NOTIFY_UNSUPPORTED_EXCHANGE_TYPE,
+ 0, 1, 0);
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ /* Run the script code for this step. */
+ if (script)
+ return script[exchange->step] (msg);
+
+ /*
+ * XXX So far we don't accept any proposals for exchanges we don't
+ * support.
+ */
+ if (payload_first(msg, ISAKMP_PAYLOAD_SA)) {
+ message_drop(msg, ISAKMP_NOTIFY_NO_PROPOSAL_CHOSEN, 0, 1, 0);
+ return -1;
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static enum hashes
+from_ike_hash(u_int16_t hash)
+{
+ switch (hash) {
+ case IKE_HASH_MD5:
+ return HASH_MD5;
+ case IKE_HASH_SHA:
+ return HASH_SHA1;
+ }
+ return -1;
+}
+
+static enum transform
+from_ike_crypto(u_int16_t crypto)
+{
+ /* Coincidentally this is the null operation :-) */
+ return crypto;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Find out whether the attribute of type TYPE with a LEN length value
+ * pointed to by VALUE is incompatible with what we can handle.
+ * VMSG is a pointer to the current message.
+ */
+int
+ipsec_is_attribute_incompatible(u_int16_t type, u_int8_t *value, u_int16_t len,
+ void *vmsg)
+{
+ struct message *msg = vmsg;
+ u_int16_t dv = decode_16(value);
+
+ if (msg->exchange->phase == 1) {
+ switch (type) {
+ case IKE_ATTR_ENCRYPTION_ALGORITHM:
+ return !crypto_get(from_ike_crypto(dv));
+ case IKE_ATTR_HASH_ALGORITHM:
+ return !hash_get(from_ike_hash(dv));
+ case IKE_ATTR_AUTHENTICATION_METHOD:
+ return !ike_auth_get(dv);
+ case IKE_ATTR_GROUP_DESCRIPTION:
+ return (dv < IKE_GROUP_DESC_MODP_768
+ || dv > IKE_GROUP_DESC_MODP_1536)
+ && (dv < IKE_GROUP_DESC_MODP_2048
+ || dv > IKE_GROUP_DESC_MODP_8192);
+ case IKE_ATTR_GROUP_TYPE:
+ return 1;
+ case IKE_ATTR_GROUP_PRIME:
+ return 1;
+ case IKE_ATTR_GROUP_GENERATOR_1:
+ return 1;
+ case IKE_ATTR_GROUP_GENERATOR_2:
+ return 1;
+ case IKE_ATTR_GROUP_CURVE_A:
+ return 1;
+ case IKE_ATTR_GROUP_CURVE_B:
+ return 1;
+ case IKE_ATTR_LIFE_TYPE:
+ return dv < IKE_DURATION_SECONDS
+ || dv > IKE_DURATION_KILOBYTES;
+ case IKE_ATTR_LIFE_DURATION:
+ return len != 2 && len != 4;
+ case IKE_ATTR_PRF:
+ return 1;
+ case IKE_ATTR_KEY_LENGTH:
+ /*
+ * Our crypto routines only allows key-lengths which
+ * are multiples of an octet.
+ */
+ return dv % 8 != 0;
+ case IKE_ATTR_FIELD_SIZE:
+ return 1;
+ case IKE_ATTR_GROUP_ORDER:
+ return 1;
+ }
+ } else {
+ switch (type) {
+ case IPSEC_ATTR_SA_LIFE_TYPE:
+ return dv < IPSEC_DURATION_SECONDS
+ || dv > IPSEC_DURATION_KILOBYTES;
+ case IPSEC_ATTR_SA_LIFE_DURATION:
+ return len != 2 && len != 4;
+ case IPSEC_ATTR_GROUP_DESCRIPTION:
+ return (dv < IKE_GROUP_DESC_MODP_768
+ || dv > IKE_GROUP_DESC_MODP_1536)
+ && (dv < IKE_GROUP_DESC_MODP_2048
+ || IKE_GROUP_DESC_MODP_8192 < dv);
+ case IPSEC_ATTR_ENCAPSULATION_MODE:
+#if defined (USE_NAT_TRAVERSAL)
+ return dv != IPSEC_ENCAP_TUNNEL
+ && dv != IPSEC_ENCAP_TRANSPORT
+ && dv != IPSEC_ENCAP_UDP_ENCAP_TUNNEL
+ && dv != IPSEC_ENCAP_UDP_ENCAP_TRANSPORT
+ && dv != IPSEC_ENCAP_UDP_ENCAP_TUNNEL_DRAFT
+ && dv != IPSEC_ENCAP_UDP_ENCAP_TRANSPORT_DRAFT;
+#else
+ return dv < IPSEC_ENCAP_TUNNEL
+ || dv > IPSEC_ENCAP_TRANSPORT;
+#endif /* USE_NAT_TRAVERSAL */
+ case IPSEC_ATTR_AUTHENTICATION_ALGORITHM:
+ return dv < IPSEC_AUTH_HMAC_MD5
+ || dv > IPSEC_AUTH_HMAC_RIPEMD;
+ case IPSEC_ATTR_KEY_LENGTH:
+ /*
+ * XXX Blowfish needs '0'. Others appear to disregard
+ * this attr?
+ */
+ return 0;
+ case IPSEC_ATTR_KEY_ROUNDS:
+ return 1;
+ case IPSEC_ATTR_COMPRESS_DICTIONARY_SIZE:
+ return 1;
+ case IPSEC_ATTR_COMPRESS_PRIVATE_ALGORITHM:
+ return 1;
+ case IPSEC_ATTR_ECN_TUNNEL:
+ return 1;
+ }
+ }
+ /* XXX Silence gcc. */
+ return 1;
+}
+
+#ifdef USE_DEBUG
+/*
+ * Log the attribute of TYPE with a LEN length value pointed to by VALUE
+ * in human-readable form. VMSG is a pointer to the current message.
+ */
+int
+ipsec_debug_attribute(u_int16_t type, u_int8_t *value, u_int16_t len,
+ void *vmsg)
+{
+ struct message *msg = vmsg;
+ char val[20];
+
+ /* XXX Transient solution. */
+ if (len == 2)
+ snprintf(val, sizeof val, "%d", decode_16(value));
+ else if (len == 4)
+ snprintf(val, sizeof val, "%d", decode_32(value));
+ else
+ snprintf(val, sizeof val, "unrepresentable");
+
+ LOG_DBG((LOG_MESSAGE, 50, "Attribute %s value %s",
+ constant_name(msg->exchange->phase == 1 ? ike_attr_cst :
+ ipsec_attr_cst, type), val));
+ return 0;
+}
+#endif
+
+/*
+ * Decode the attribute of type TYPE with a LEN length value pointed to by
+ * VALUE. VIDA is a pointer to a context structure where we can find the
+ * current message, SA and protocol.
+ */
+int
+ipsec_decode_attribute(u_int16_t type, u_int8_t *value, u_int16_t len,
+ void *vida)
+{
+ struct ipsec_decode_arg *ida = vida;
+ struct message *msg = ida->msg;
+ struct sa *sa = ida->sa;
+ struct ipsec_sa *isa = sa->data;
+ struct proto *proto = ida->proto;
+ struct ipsec_proto *iproto = proto->data;
+ struct exchange *exchange = msg->exchange;
+ struct ipsec_exch *ie = exchange->data;
+ static int lifetype = 0;
+
+ if (exchange->phase == 1) {
+ switch (type) {
+ case IKE_ATTR_ENCRYPTION_ALGORITHM:
+ /* XXX Errors possible? */
+ exchange->crypto = crypto_get(from_ike_crypto(
+ decode_16(value)));
+ break;
+ case IKE_ATTR_HASH_ALGORITHM:
+ /* XXX Errors possible? */
+ ie->hash = hash_get(from_ike_hash(decode_16(value)));
+ break;
+ case IKE_ATTR_AUTHENTICATION_METHOD:
+ /* XXX Errors possible? */
+ ie->ike_auth = ike_auth_get(decode_16(value));
+ break;
+ case IKE_ATTR_GROUP_DESCRIPTION:
+ isa->group_desc = decode_16(value);
+ break;
+ case IKE_ATTR_GROUP_TYPE:
+ break;
+ case IKE_ATTR_GROUP_PRIME:
+ break;
+ case IKE_ATTR_GROUP_GENERATOR_1:
+ break;
+ case IKE_ATTR_GROUP_GENERATOR_2:
+ break;
+ case IKE_ATTR_GROUP_CURVE_A:
+ break;
+ case IKE_ATTR_GROUP_CURVE_B:
+ break;
+ case IKE_ATTR_LIFE_TYPE:
+ lifetype = decode_16(value);
+ return 0;
+ case IKE_ATTR_LIFE_DURATION:
+ switch (lifetype) {
+ case IKE_DURATION_SECONDS:
+ switch (len) {
+ case 2:
+ sa->seconds = decode_16(value);
+ break;
+ case 4:
+ sa->seconds = decode_32(value);
+ break;
+ default:
+ log_print("ipsec_decode_attribute: "
+ "unreasonable lifetime");
+ }
+ break;
+ case IKE_DURATION_KILOBYTES:
+ switch (len) {
+ case 2:
+ sa->kilobytes = decode_16(value);
+ break;
+ case 4:
+ sa->kilobytes = decode_32(value);
+ break;
+ default:
+ log_print("ipsec_decode_attribute: "
+ "unreasonable lifetime");
+ }
+ break;
+ default:
+ log_print("ipsec_decode_attribute: unknown "
+ "lifetime type");
+ }
+ break;
+ case IKE_ATTR_PRF:
+ break;
+ case IKE_ATTR_KEY_LENGTH:
+ exchange->key_length = decode_16(value) / 8;
+ break;
+ case IKE_ATTR_FIELD_SIZE:
+ break;
+ case IKE_ATTR_GROUP_ORDER:
+ break;
+ }
+ } else {
+ switch (type) {
+ case IPSEC_ATTR_SA_LIFE_TYPE:
+ lifetype = decode_16(value);
+ return 0;
+ case IPSEC_ATTR_SA_LIFE_DURATION:
+ switch (lifetype) {
+ case IPSEC_DURATION_SECONDS:
+ switch (len) {
+ case 2:
+ sa->seconds = decode_16(value);
+ break;
+ case 4:
+ sa->seconds = decode_32(value);
+ break;
+ default:
+ log_print("ipsec_decode_attribute: "
+ "unreasonable lifetime");
+ }
+ break;
+ case IPSEC_DURATION_KILOBYTES:
+ switch (len) {
+ case 2:
+ sa->kilobytes = decode_16(value);
+ break;
+ case 4:
+ sa->kilobytes = decode_32(value);
+ break;
+ default:
+ log_print("ipsec_decode_attribute: "
+ "unreasonable lifetime");
+ }
+ break;
+ default:
+ log_print("ipsec_decode_attribute: unknown "
+ "lifetime type");
+ }
+ break;
+ case IPSEC_ATTR_GROUP_DESCRIPTION:
+ isa->group_desc = decode_16(value);
+ break;
+ case IPSEC_ATTR_ENCAPSULATION_MODE:
+ /*
+ * XXX Multiple protocols must have same
+ * encapsulation mode, no?
+ */
+ iproto->encap_mode = decode_16(value);
+ break;
+ case IPSEC_ATTR_AUTHENTICATION_ALGORITHM:
+ iproto->auth = decode_16(value);
+ break;
+ case IPSEC_ATTR_KEY_LENGTH:
+ iproto->keylen = decode_16(value);
+ break;
+ case IPSEC_ATTR_KEY_ROUNDS:
+ iproto->keyrounds = decode_16(value);
+ break;
+ case IPSEC_ATTR_COMPRESS_DICTIONARY_SIZE:
+ break;
+ case IPSEC_ATTR_COMPRESS_PRIVATE_ALGORITHM:
+ break;
+ case IPSEC_ATTR_ECN_TUNNEL:
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ lifetype = 0;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Walk over the attributes of the transform payload found in BUF, and
+ * fill out the fields of the SA attached to MSG. Also mark the SA as
+ * processed.
+ */
+void
+ipsec_decode_transform(struct message *msg, struct sa *sa, struct proto *proto,
+ u_int8_t *buf)
+{
+ struct ipsec_exch *ie = msg->exchange->data;
+ struct ipsec_decode_arg ida;
+
+ LOG_DBG((LOG_MISC, 20, "ipsec_decode_transform: transform %d chosen",
+ GET_ISAKMP_TRANSFORM_NO(buf)));
+
+ ida.msg = msg;
+ ida.sa = sa;
+ ida.proto = proto;
+
+ /* The default IKE lifetime is 8 hours. */
+ if (sa->phase == 1)
+ sa->seconds = 28800;
+
+ /* Extract the attributes and stuff them into the SA. */
+ attribute_map(buf + ISAKMP_TRANSFORM_SA_ATTRS_OFF,
+ GET_ISAKMP_GEN_LENGTH(buf) - ISAKMP_TRANSFORM_SA_ATTRS_OFF,
+ ipsec_decode_attribute, &ida);
+
+ /*
+ * If no pseudo-random function was negotiated, it's HMAC.
+ * XXX As PRF_HMAC currently is zero, this is a no-op.
+ */
+ if (!ie->prf_type)
+ ie->prf_type = PRF_HMAC;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Delete the IPsec SA represented by the INCOMING direction in protocol PROTO
+ * of the IKE security association SA.
+ */
+static void
+ipsec_delete_spi(struct sa *sa, struct proto *proto, int incoming)
+{
+ if (sa->phase == 1)
+ return;
+ /* XXX Error handling? Is it interesting? */
+ sysdep_ipsec_delete_spi(sa, proto, incoming);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Store BUF into the g^x entry of the exchange that message MSG belongs to.
+ * PEER is non-zero when the value is our peer's, and zero when it is ours.
+ */
+static int
+ipsec_g_x(struct message *msg, int peer, u_int8_t *buf)
+{
+ struct exchange *exchange = msg->exchange;
+ struct ipsec_exch *ie = exchange->data;
+ u_int8_t **g_x;
+ int initiator = exchange->initiator ^ peer;
+ char header[32];
+
+ g_x = initiator ? &ie->g_xi : &ie->g_xr;
+ *g_x = malloc(ie->g_x_len);
+ if (!*g_x) {
+ log_error("ipsec_g_x: malloc (%lu) failed",
+ (unsigned long)ie->g_x_len);
+ return -1;
+ }
+ memcpy(*g_x, buf, ie->g_x_len);
+ snprintf(header, sizeof header, "ipsec_g_x: g^x%c",
+ initiator ? 'i' : 'r');
+ LOG_DBG_BUF((LOG_MISC, 80, header, *g_x, ie->g_x_len));
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/* Generate our DH value. */
+int
+ipsec_gen_g_x(struct message *msg)
+{
+ struct exchange *exchange = msg->exchange;
+ struct ipsec_exch *ie = exchange->data;
+ u_int8_t *buf;
+
+ buf = malloc(ISAKMP_KE_SZ + ie->g_x_len);
+ if (!buf) {
+ log_error("ipsec_gen_g_x: malloc (%lu) failed",
+ ISAKMP_KE_SZ + (unsigned long)ie->g_x_len);
+ return -1;
+ }
+ if (message_add_payload(msg, ISAKMP_PAYLOAD_KEY_EXCH, buf,
+ ISAKMP_KE_SZ + ie->g_x_len, 1)) {
+ free(buf);
+ return -1;
+ }
+ if (dh_create_exchange(ie->group, buf + ISAKMP_KE_DATA_OFF)) {
+ log_print("ipsec_gen_g_x: dh_create_exchange failed");
+ free(buf);
+ return -1;
+ }
+ return ipsec_g_x(msg, 0, buf + ISAKMP_KE_DATA_OFF);
+}
+
+/* Save the peer's DH value. */
+int
+ipsec_save_g_x(struct message *msg)
+{
+ struct exchange *exchange = msg->exchange;
+ struct ipsec_exch *ie = exchange->data;
+ struct payload *kep;
+
+ kep = payload_first(msg, ISAKMP_PAYLOAD_KEY_EXCH);
+ kep->flags |= PL_MARK;
+ ie->g_x_len = GET_ISAKMP_GEN_LENGTH(kep->p) - ISAKMP_KE_DATA_OFF;
+
+ /* Check that the given length matches the group's expectancy. */
+ if (ie->g_x_len != (size_t) dh_getlen(ie->group)) {
+ /* XXX Is this a good notify type? */
+ message_drop(msg, ISAKMP_NOTIFY_PAYLOAD_MALFORMED, 0, 1, 0);
+ return -1;
+ }
+ return ipsec_g_x(msg, 1, kep->p + ISAKMP_KE_DATA_OFF);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Get a SPI for PROTO and the transport MSG passed over. Store the
+ * size where SZ points. NB! A zero return is OK if *SZ is zero.
+ */
+static u_int8_t *
+ipsec_get_spi(size_t *sz, u_int8_t proto, struct message *msg)
+{
+ struct sockaddr *dst, *src;
+ struct transport *transport = msg->transport;
+
+ if (msg->exchange->phase == 1) {
+ *sz = 0;
+ return 0;
+ } else {
+ /* We are the destination in the SA we want a SPI for. */
+ transport->vtbl->get_src(transport, &dst);
+ /* The peer is the source. */
+ transport->vtbl->get_dst(transport, &src);
+ return sysdep_ipsec_get_spi(sz, proto, src, dst,
+ msg->exchange->seq);
+ }
+}
+
+/*
+ * We have gotten a payload PAYLOAD of type TYPE, which did not get handled
+ * by the logic of the exchange MSG takes part in. Now is the time to deal
+ * with such a payload if we know how to, if we don't, return -1, otherwise
+ * 0.
+ */
+int
+ipsec_handle_leftover_payload(struct message *msg, u_int8_t type,
+ struct payload *payload)
+{
+ u_int32_t spisz, nspis;
+ struct sockaddr *dst;
+ int reenter = 0;
+ u_int8_t *spis, proto;
+ struct sa *sa;
+
+ switch (type) {
+ case ISAKMP_PAYLOAD_DELETE:
+ proto = GET_ISAKMP_DELETE_PROTO(payload->p);
+ nspis = GET_ISAKMP_DELETE_NSPIS(payload->p);
+ spisz = GET_ISAKMP_DELETE_SPI_SZ(payload->p);
+
+ if (nspis == 0) {
+ LOG_DBG((LOG_SA, 60, "ipsec_handle_leftover_payload: "
+ "message specified zero SPIs, ignoring"));
+ return -1;
+ }
+ /* verify proper SPI size */
+ if ((proto == ISAKMP_PROTO_ISAKMP && spisz !=
+ ISAKMP_HDR_COOKIES_LEN)
+ || (proto != ISAKMP_PROTO_ISAKMP && spisz !=
+ sizeof(u_int32_t))) {
+ log_print("ipsec_handle_leftover_payload: invalid SPI "
+ "size %d for proto %d in DELETE payload",
+ spisz, proto);
+ return -1;
+ }
+ spis = (u_int8_t *) malloc(nspis * spisz);
+ if (!spis) {
+ log_error("ipsec_handle_leftover_payload: malloc "
+ "(%d) failed", nspis * spisz);
+ return -1;
+ }
+ /* extract SPI and get dst address */
+ memcpy(spis, payload->p + ISAKMP_DELETE_SPI_OFF, nspis * spisz);
+ msg->transport->vtbl->get_dst(msg->transport, &dst);
+
+ ipsec_delete_spi_list(dst, proto, spis, nspis, "DELETE");
+
+ free(spis);
+ payload->flags |= PL_MARK;
+ return 0;
+
+ case ISAKMP_PAYLOAD_NOTIFY:
+ switch (GET_ISAKMP_NOTIFY_MSG_TYPE(payload->p)) {
+ case IPSEC_NOTIFY_INITIAL_CONTACT:
+ /*
+ * Permit INITIAL-CONTACT if
+ * - this is not an AGGRESSIVE mode exchange
+ * - it is protected by an ISAKMP SA
+ *
+ * XXX Instead of the first condition above, we could
+ * XXX permit this only for phase 2. In the last
+ * XXX packet of main-mode, this payload, while
+ * XXX encrypted, is not part of the hash digest. As
+ * XXX we currently send our own INITIAL-CONTACTs at
+ * XXX this point, this too would need to be changed.
+ */
+ if (msg->exchange->type == ISAKMP_EXCH_AGGRESSIVE) {
+ log_print("ipsec_handle_leftover_payload: got "
+ "INITIAL-CONTACT in AGGRESSIVE mode");
+ return -1;
+ }
+ if ((msg->exchange->flags & EXCHANGE_FLAG_ENCRYPT)
+ == 0) {
+ log_print("ipsec_handle_leftover_payload: got "
+ "INITIAL-CONTACT without ISAKMP SA");
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ if ((msg->flags & MSG_AUTHENTICATED) == 0) {
+ log_print("ipsec_handle_leftover_payload: "
+ "got unauthenticated INITIAL-CONTACT");
+ return -1;
+ }
+ /*
+ * Find out who is sending this and then delete every
+ * SA that is ready. Exchanges will timeout
+ * themselves and then the non-ready SAs will
+ * disappear too.
+ */
+ msg->transport->vtbl->get_dst(msg->transport, &dst);
+ while ((sa = sa_lookup_by_peer(dst,
+ sysdep_sa_len(dst))) != 0) {
+ /*
+ * Don't delete the current SA -- we received
+ * the notification over it, so it's obviously
+ * still active. We temporarily need to remove
+ * the SA from the list to avoid an endless
+ * loop, but keep a reference so it won't
+ * disappear meanwhile.
+ */
+ if (sa == msg->isakmp_sa) {
+ sa_reference(sa);
+ sa_remove(sa);
+ reenter = 1;
+ continue;
+ }
+ LOG_DBG((LOG_SA, 30,
+ "ipsec_handle_leftover_payload: "
+ "INITIAL-CONTACT made us delete SA %p",
+ sa));
+ sa_delete(sa, 0);
+ }
+
+ if (reenter) {
+ sa_enter(msg->isakmp_sa);
+ sa_release(msg->isakmp_sa);
+ }
+ payload->flags |= PL_MARK;
+ return 0;
+ }
+ }
+ return -1;
+}
+
+/* Return the encryption keylength in octets of the ESP protocol PROTO. */
+int
+ipsec_esp_enckeylength(struct proto *proto)
+{
+ struct ipsec_proto *iproto = proto->data;
+
+ /* Compute the keylength to use. */
+ switch (proto->id) {
+ case IPSEC_ESP_DES:
+ case IPSEC_ESP_DES_IV32:
+ case IPSEC_ESP_DES_IV64:
+ return 8;
+ case IPSEC_ESP_3DES:
+ return 24;
+ case IPSEC_ESP_CAST:
+ if (!iproto->keylen)
+ return 16;
+ return iproto->keylen / 8;
+ case IPSEC_ESP_AES:
+ case IPSEC_ESP_AES_128_CTR:
+ if (!iproto->keylen)
+ return 16;
+ /* Fallthrough */
+ default:
+ return iproto->keylen / 8;
+ }
+}
+
+/* Return the authentication keylength in octets of the ESP protocol PROTO. */
+int
+ipsec_esp_authkeylength(struct proto *proto)
+{
+ struct ipsec_proto *iproto = proto->data;
+
+ switch (iproto->auth) {
+ case IPSEC_AUTH_HMAC_MD5:
+ return 16;
+ case IPSEC_AUTH_HMAC_SHA:
+ case IPSEC_AUTH_HMAC_RIPEMD:
+ return 20;
+ case IPSEC_AUTH_HMAC_SHA2_256:
+ return 32;
+ case IPSEC_AUTH_HMAC_SHA2_384:
+ return 48;
+ case IPSEC_AUTH_HMAC_SHA2_512:
+ return 64;
+ default:
+ return 0;
+ }
+}
+
+/* Return the authentication keylength in octets of the AH protocol PROTO. */
+int
+ipsec_ah_keylength(struct proto *proto)
+{
+ switch (proto->id) {
+ case IPSEC_AH_MD5:
+ return 16;
+ case IPSEC_AH_SHA:
+ case IPSEC_AH_RIPEMD:
+ return 20;
+ case IPSEC_AH_SHA2_256:
+ return 32;
+ case IPSEC_AH_SHA2_384:
+ return 48;
+ case IPSEC_AH_SHA2_512:
+ return 64;
+ default:
+ return -1;
+ }
+}
+
+/* Return the total keymaterial length of the protocol PROTO. */
+int
+ipsec_keymat_length(struct proto *proto)
+{
+ switch (proto->proto) {
+ case IPSEC_PROTO_IPSEC_ESP:
+ return ipsec_esp_enckeylength(proto)
+ + ipsec_esp_authkeylength(proto);
+ case IPSEC_PROTO_IPSEC_AH:
+ return ipsec_ah_keylength(proto);
+ default:
+ return -1;
+ }
+}
+
+/* Helper function for ipsec_get_id(). */
+static int
+ipsec_get_proto_port(char *section, u_int8_t *tproto, u_int16_t *port)
+{
+ struct protoent *pe = NULL;
+ struct servent *se;
+ char *pstr;
+
+ pstr = conf_get_str(section, "Protocol");
+ if (!pstr) {
+ *tproto = 0;
+ return 0;
+ }
+ *tproto = (u_int8_t)atoi(pstr);
+ if (!*tproto) {
+ pe = getprotobyname(pstr);
+ if (pe)
+ *tproto = pe->p_proto;
+ }
+ if (!*tproto) {
+ log_print("ipsec_get_proto_port: protocol \"%s\" unknown",
+ pstr);
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ pstr = conf_get_str(section, "Port");
+ if (!pstr)
+ return 0;
+ *port = (u_int16_t)atoi(pstr);
+ if (!*port) {
+ se = getservbyname(pstr,
+ pe ? pe->p_name : (pstr ? pstr : NULL));
+ if (se)
+ *port = se->s_port;
+ }
+ if (!*port) {
+ log_print("ipsec_get_proto_port: port \"%s\" unknown",
+ pstr);
+ return -1;
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Out of a named section SECTION in the configuration file find out
+ * the network address and mask as well as the ID type. Put the info
+ * in the areas pointed to by ADDR, MASK, TPROTO, PORT, and ID respectively.
+ * Return 0 on success and -1 on failure.
+ */
+int
+ipsec_get_id(char *section, int *id, struct sockaddr **addr,
+ struct sockaddr **mask, u_int8_t *tproto, u_int16_t *port)
+{
+ char *type, *address, *netmask;
+
+ type = conf_get_str(section, "ID-type");
+ if (!type) {
+ log_print("ipsec_get_id: section %s has no \"ID-type\" tag",
+ section);
+ return -1;
+ }
+ *id = constant_value(ipsec_id_cst, type);
+ switch (*id) {
+ case IPSEC_ID_IPV4_ADDR:
+ case IPSEC_ID_IPV6_ADDR: {
+ int ret;
+
+ address = conf_get_str(section, "Address");
+ if (!address) {
+ log_print("ipsec_get_id: section %s has no "
+ "\"Address\" tag", section);
+ return -1;
+ }
+ if (text2sockaddr(address, NULL, addr)) {
+ log_print("ipsec_get_id: invalid address %s in "
+ "section %s", address, section);
+ return -1;
+ }
+ ret = ipsec_get_proto_port(section, tproto, port);
+ if (ret < 0)
+ free(*addr);
+
+ return ret;
+ }
+
+#ifdef notyet
+ case IPSEC_ID_FQDN:
+ return -1;
+
+ case IPSEC_ID_USER_FQDN:
+ return -1;
+#endif
+
+ case IPSEC_ID_IPV4_ADDR_SUBNET:
+ case IPSEC_ID_IPV6_ADDR_SUBNET: {
+ int ret;
+
+ address = conf_get_str(section, "Network");
+ if (!address) {
+ log_print("ipsec_get_id: section %s has no "
+ "\"Network\" tag", section);
+ return -1;
+ }
+ if (text2sockaddr(address, NULL, addr)) {
+ log_print("ipsec_get_id: invalid section %s "
+ "network %s", section, address);
+ return -1;
+ }
+ netmask = conf_get_str(section, "Netmask");
+ if (!netmask) {
+ log_print("ipsec_get_id: section %s has no "
+ "\"Netmask\" tag", section);
+ free(*addr);
+ return -1;
+ }
+ if (text2sockaddr(netmask, NULL, mask)) {
+ log_print("ipsec_id_build: invalid section %s "
+ "network %s", section, netmask);
+ free(*addr);
+ return -1;
+ }
+ ret = ipsec_get_proto_port(section, tproto, port);
+ if (ret < 0) {
+ free(*mask);
+ free(*addr);
+ }
+ return ret;
+ }
+
+#ifdef notyet
+ case IPSEC_ID_IPV4_RANGE:
+ return -1;
+
+ case IPSEC_ID_IPV6_RANGE:
+ return -1;
+
+ case IPSEC_ID_DER_ASN1_DN:
+ return -1;
+
+ case IPSEC_ID_DER_ASN1_GN:
+ return -1;
+
+ case IPSEC_ID_KEY_ID:
+ return -1;
+#endif
+
+ default:
+ log_print("ipsec_get_id: unknown ID type \"%s\" in "
+ "section %s", type, section);
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * XXX I rather want this function to return a status code, and fail if
+ * we cannot fit the information in the supplied buffer.
+ */
+static void
+ipsec_decode_id(char *buf, size_t size, u_int8_t *id, size_t id_len,
+ int isakmpform)
+{
+ int id_type;
+ char *addr = 0, *mask = 0;
+ u_int32_t *idp;
+
+ if (id) {
+ if (!isakmpform) {
+ /*
+ * Exchanges and SAs dont carry the IDs in ISAKMP
+ * form.
+ */
+ id -= ISAKMP_GEN_SZ;
+ id_len += ISAKMP_GEN_SZ;
+ }
+ id_type = GET_ISAKMP_ID_TYPE(id);
+ idp = (u_int32_t *) (id + ISAKMP_ID_DATA_OFF);
+ switch (id_type) {
+ case IPSEC_ID_IPV4_ADDR:
+ util_ntoa(&addr, AF_INET, id + ISAKMP_ID_DATA_OFF);
+ snprintf(buf, size, "%08x: %s",
+ decode_32(id + ISAKMP_ID_DATA_OFF), addr);
+ break;
+
+ case IPSEC_ID_IPV4_ADDR_SUBNET:
+ util_ntoa(&addr, AF_INET, id + ISAKMP_ID_DATA_OFF);
+ util_ntoa(&mask, AF_INET, id + ISAKMP_ID_DATA_OFF + 4);
+ snprintf(buf, size, "%08x/%08x: %s/%s",
+ decode_32(id + ISAKMP_ID_DATA_OFF),
+ decode_32(id + ISAKMP_ID_DATA_OFF + 4), addr, mask);
+ break;
+
+ case IPSEC_ID_IPV6_ADDR:
+ util_ntoa(&addr, AF_INET6, id + ISAKMP_ID_DATA_OFF);
+ snprintf(buf, size, "%08x%08x%08x%08x: %s", *idp,
+ *(idp + 1), *(idp + 2), *(idp + 3), addr);
+ break;
+
+ case IPSEC_ID_IPV6_ADDR_SUBNET:
+ util_ntoa(&addr, AF_INET6, id + ISAKMP_ID_DATA_OFF);
+ util_ntoa(&mask, AF_INET6, id + ISAKMP_ID_DATA_OFF +
+ sizeof(struct in6_addr));
+ snprintf(buf, size,
+ "%08x%08x%08x%08x/%08x%08x%08x%08x: %s/%s", *idp,
+ *(idp + 1), *(idp + 2), *(idp + 3), *(idp + 4),
+ *(idp + 5), *(idp + 6), *(idp + 7), addr, mask);
+ break;
+
+ case IPSEC_ID_FQDN:
+ case IPSEC_ID_USER_FQDN:
+ /* String is not NUL terminated, be careful */
+ id_len -= ISAKMP_ID_DATA_OFF;
+ id_len = MIN(id_len, size - 1);
+ memcpy(buf, id + ISAKMP_ID_DATA_OFF, id_len);
+ buf[id_len] = '\0';
+ break;
+
+#ifdef USE_X509
+ case IPSEC_ID_DER_ASN1_DN:
+ addr = x509_DN_string(id + ISAKMP_ID_DATA_OFF,
+ id_len - ISAKMP_ID_DATA_OFF);
+ if (!addr) {
+ snprintf(buf, size, "unparsable ASN1 DN ID");
+ return;
+ }
+ strlcpy(buf, addr, size);
+ break;
+#endif
+
+ default:
+ snprintf(buf, size, "<id type unknown: %x>", id_type);
+ break;
+ }
+ } else
+ snprintf(buf, size, "<no ipsec id>");
+ if (addr)
+ free(addr);
+ if (mask)
+ free(mask);
+}
+
+char *
+ipsec_decode_ids(char *fmt, u_int8_t *id1, size_t id1_len, u_int8_t *id2,
+ size_t id2_len, int isakmpform)
+{
+ static char result[1024];
+ char s_id1[256], s_id2[256];
+
+ ipsec_decode_id(s_id1, sizeof s_id1, id1, id1_len, isakmpform);
+ ipsec_decode_id(s_id2, sizeof s_id2, id2, id2_len, isakmpform);
+
+ snprintf(result, sizeof result, fmt, s_id1, s_id2);
+ return result;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Out of a named section SECTION in the configuration file build an
+ * ISAKMP ID payload. Ths payload size should be stashed in SZ.
+ * The caller is responsible for freeing the payload.
+ */
+u_int8_t *
+ipsec_build_id(char *section, size_t *sz)
+{
+ struct sockaddr *addr, *mask;
+ u_int8_t *p;
+ int id, subnet = 0;
+ u_int8_t tproto = 0;
+ u_int16_t port = 0;
+
+ if (ipsec_get_id(section, &id, &addr, &mask, &tproto, &port))
+ return 0;
+
+ if (id == IPSEC_ID_IPV4_ADDR_SUBNET || id == IPSEC_ID_IPV6_ADDR_SUBNET)
+ subnet = 1;
+
+ *sz = ISAKMP_ID_SZ + sockaddr_addrlen(addr);
+ if (subnet)
+ *sz += sockaddr_addrlen(mask);
+
+ p = malloc(*sz);
+ if (!p) {
+ log_print("ipsec_build_id: malloc(%lu) failed",
+ (unsigned long)*sz);
+ if (subnet)
+ free(mask);
+ free(addr);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ SET_ISAKMP_ID_TYPE(p, id);
+ SET_ISAKMP_ID_DOI_DATA(p, (unsigned char *)"\000\000\000");
+
+ memcpy(p + ISAKMP_ID_DATA_OFF, sockaddr_addrdata(addr),
+ sockaddr_addrlen(addr));
+ if (subnet)
+ memcpy(p + ISAKMP_ID_DATA_OFF + sockaddr_addrlen(addr),
+ sockaddr_addrdata(mask), sockaddr_addrlen(mask));
+
+ SET_IPSEC_ID_PROTO(p + ISAKMP_ID_DOI_DATA_OFF, tproto);
+ SET_IPSEC_ID_PORT(p + ISAKMP_ID_DOI_DATA_OFF, port);
+
+ if (subnet)
+ free(mask);
+ free(addr);
+ return p;
+}
+
+/*
+ * copy an ISAKMPD id
+ */
+int
+ipsec_clone_id(u_int8_t **did, size_t *did_len, u_int8_t *id, size_t id_len)
+{
+ if (*did)
+ free(*did);
+
+ if (!id_len || !id) {
+ *did = 0;
+ *did_len = 0;
+ return 0;
+ }
+ *did = malloc(id_len);
+ if (!*did) {
+ *did_len = 0;
+ log_error("ipsec_clone_id: malloc(%lu) failed",
+ (unsigned long)id_len);
+ return -1;
+ }
+ *did_len = id_len;
+ memcpy(*did, id, id_len);
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * IPsec-specific PROTO initializations. SECTION is only set if we are the
+ * initiator thus only usable there.
+ * XXX I want to fix this later.
+ */
+void
+ipsec_proto_init(struct proto *proto, char *section)
+{
+ struct ipsec_proto *iproto = proto->data;
+
+ if (proto->sa->phase == 2)
+ iproto->replay_window = section ? conf_get_num(section,
+ "ReplayWindow", DEFAULT_REPLAY_WINDOW) :
+ DEFAULT_REPLAY_WINDOW;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Add a notification payload of type INITIAL CONTACT to MSG if this is
+ * the first contact we have made to our peer.
+ */
+int
+ipsec_initial_contact(struct message *msg)
+{
+ u_int8_t *buf;
+
+ if (ipsec_contacted(msg))
+ return 0;
+
+ buf = malloc(ISAKMP_NOTIFY_SZ + ISAKMP_HDR_COOKIES_LEN);
+ if (!buf) {
+ log_error("ike_phase_1_initial_contact: malloc (%d) failed",
+ ISAKMP_NOTIFY_SZ + ISAKMP_HDR_COOKIES_LEN);
+ return -1;
+ }
+ SET_ISAKMP_NOTIFY_DOI(buf, IPSEC_DOI_IPSEC);
+ SET_ISAKMP_NOTIFY_PROTO(buf, ISAKMP_PROTO_ISAKMP);
+ SET_ISAKMP_NOTIFY_SPI_SZ(buf, ISAKMP_HDR_COOKIES_LEN);
+ SET_ISAKMP_NOTIFY_MSG_TYPE(buf, IPSEC_NOTIFY_INITIAL_CONTACT);
+ memcpy(buf + ISAKMP_NOTIFY_SPI_OFF, msg->isakmp_sa->cookies,
+ ISAKMP_HDR_COOKIES_LEN);
+ if (message_add_payload(msg, ISAKMP_PAYLOAD_NOTIFY, buf,
+ ISAKMP_NOTIFY_SZ + ISAKMP_HDR_COOKIES_LEN, 1)) {
+ free(buf);
+ return -1;
+ }
+ return ipsec_add_contact(msg);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Compare the two contacts pointed to by A and B. Return negative if
+ * *A < *B, 0 if they are equal, and positive if *A is the largest of them.
+ */
+static int
+addr_cmp(const void *a, const void *b)
+{
+ const struct contact *x = a, *y = b;
+ int minlen = MIN(x->len, y->len);
+ int rv = memcmp(x->addr, y->addr, minlen);
+
+ return rv ? rv : (x->len - y->len);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Add the peer that MSG is bound to as an address we don't want to send
+ * INITIAL CONTACT too from now on. Do not call this function with a
+ * specific address duplicate times. We want fast lookup, speed of insertion
+ * is unimportant, if this is to scale.
+ */
+static int
+ipsec_add_contact(struct message *msg)
+{
+ struct contact *new_contacts;
+ struct sockaddr *dst, *addr;
+ int cnt;
+
+ if (contact_cnt == contact_limit) {
+ cnt = contact_limit ? 2 * contact_limit : 64;
+ new_contacts = realloc(contacts, cnt * sizeof contacts[0]);
+ if (!new_contacts) {
+ log_error("ipsec_add_contact: "
+ "realloc (%p, %lu) failed", contacts,
+ cnt * (unsigned long) sizeof contacts[0]);
+ return -1;
+ }
+ contact_limit = cnt;
+ contacts = new_contacts;
+ }
+ msg->transport->vtbl->get_dst(msg->transport, &dst);
+ addr = malloc(sysdep_sa_len(dst));
+ if (!addr) {
+ log_error("ipsec_add_contact: malloc (%d) failed",
+ sysdep_sa_len(dst));
+ return -1;
+ }
+ memcpy(addr, dst, sysdep_sa_len(dst));
+ contacts[contact_cnt].addr = addr;
+ contacts[contact_cnt++].len = sysdep_sa_len(dst);
+
+ /*
+ * XXX There are better algorithms for already mostly-sorted data like
+ * this, but only qsort is standard. I will someday do this inline.
+ */
+ qsort(contacts, contact_cnt, sizeof *contacts, addr_cmp);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/* Return true if the recipient of MSG has already been contacted. */
+static int
+ipsec_contacted(struct message *msg)
+{
+ struct contact contact;
+
+ msg->transport->vtbl->get_dst(msg->transport, &contact.addr);
+ contact.len = sysdep_sa_len(contact.addr);
+ return contacts ? (bsearch(&contact, contacts, contact_cnt,
+ sizeof *contacts, addr_cmp) != 0) : 0;
+}
+
+/* Add a HASH for to MSG. */
+u_int8_t *
+ipsec_add_hash_payload(struct message *msg, size_t hashsize)
+{
+ u_int8_t *buf;
+
+ buf = malloc(ISAKMP_HASH_SZ + hashsize);
+ if (!buf) {
+ log_error("ipsec_add_hash_payload: malloc (%lu) failed",
+ ISAKMP_HASH_SZ + (unsigned long) hashsize);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ if (message_add_payload(msg, ISAKMP_PAYLOAD_HASH, buf,
+ ISAKMP_HASH_SZ + hashsize, 1)) {
+ free(buf);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ return buf;
+}
+
+/* Fill in the HASH payload of MSG. */
+int
+ipsec_fill_in_hash(struct message *msg)
+{
+ struct exchange *exchange = msg->exchange;
+ struct sa *isakmp_sa = msg->isakmp_sa;
+ struct ipsec_sa *isa = isakmp_sa->data;
+ struct hash *hash = hash_get(isa->hash);
+ struct prf *prf;
+ struct payload *payload;
+ u_int8_t *buf;
+ u_int32_t i;
+ char header[80];
+
+ /* If no SKEYID_a, we need not do anything. */
+ if (!isa->skeyid_a)
+ return 0;
+
+ payload = payload_first(msg, ISAKMP_PAYLOAD_HASH);
+ if (!payload) {
+ log_print("ipsec_fill_in_hash: no HASH payload found");
+ return -1;
+ }
+ buf = payload->p;
+
+ /* Allocate the prf and start calculating our HASH(1). */
+ LOG_DBG_BUF((LOG_MISC, 90, "ipsec_fill_in_hash: SKEYID_a",
+ isa->skeyid_a, isa->skeyid_len));
+ prf = prf_alloc(isa->prf_type, hash->type, isa->skeyid_a,
+ isa->skeyid_len);
+ if (!prf)
+ return -1;
+
+ prf->Init(prf->prfctx);
+ LOG_DBG_BUF((LOG_MISC, 90, "ipsec_fill_in_hash: message_id",
+ exchange->message_id, ISAKMP_HDR_MESSAGE_ID_LEN));
+ prf->Update(prf->prfctx, exchange->message_id,
+ ISAKMP_HDR_MESSAGE_ID_LEN);
+
+ /* Loop over all payloads after HASH(1). */
+ for (i = 2; i < msg->iovlen; i++) {
+ /* XXX Misleading payload type printouts. */
+ snprintf(header, sizeof header,
+ "ipsec_fill_in_hash: payload %d after HASH(1)", i - 1);
+ LOG_DBG_BUF((LOG_MISC, 90, header, msg->iov[i].iov_base,
+ msg->iov[i].iov_len));
+ prf->Update(prf->prfctx, msg->iov[i].iov_base,
+ msg->iov[i].iov_len);
+ }
+ prf->Final(buf + ISAKMP_HASH_DATA_OFF, prf->prfctx);
+ prf_free(prf);
+ LOG_DBG_BUF((LOG_MISC, 80, "ipsec_fill_in_hash: HASH(1)", buf +
+ ISAKMP_HASH_DATA_OFF, hash->hashsize));
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/* Add a HASH payload to MSG, if we have an ISAKMP SA we're protected by. */
+static int
+ipsec_informational_pre_hook(struct message *msg)
+{
+ struct sa *isakmp_sa = msg->isakmp_sa;
+ struct ipsec_sa *isa;
+ struct hash *hash;
+
+ if (!isakmp_sa)
+ return 0;
+ isa = isakmp_sa->data;
+ hash = hash_get(isa->hash);
+ return ipsec_add_hash_payload(msg, hash->hashsize) == 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Fill in the HASH payload in MSG, if we have an ISAKMP SA we're protected by.
+ */
+static int
+ipsec_informational_post_hook(struct message *msg)
+{
+ if (!msg->isakmp_sa)
+ return 0;
+ return ipsec_fill_in_hash(msg);
+}
+
+ssize_t
+ipsec_id_size(char *section, u_int8_t *id)
+{
+ char *type, *data;
+
+ type = conf_get_str(section, "ID-type");
+ if (!type) {
+ log_print("ipsec_id_size: section %s has no \"ID-type\" tag",
+ section);
+ return -1;
+ }
+ *id = constant_value(ipsec_id_cst, type);
+ switch (*id) {
+ case IPSEC_ID_IPV4_ADDR:
+ return sizeof(struct in_addr);
+ case IPSEC_ID_IPV4_ADDR_SUBNET:
+ return 2 * sizeof(struct in_addr);
+ case IPSEC_ID_IPV6_ADDR:
+ return sizeof(struct in6_addr);
+ case IPSEC_ID_IPV6_ADDR_SUBNET:
+ return 2 * sizeof(struct in6_addr);
+ case IPSEC_ID_FQDN:
+ case IPSEC_ID_USER_FQDN:
+ case IPSEC_ID_KEY_ID:
+ case IPSEC_ID_DER_ASN1_DN:
+ case IPSEC_ID_DER_ASN1_GN:
+ data = conf_get_str(section, "Name");
+ if (!data) {
+ log_print("ipsec_id_size: "
+ "section %s has no \"Name\" tag", section);
+ return -1;
+ }
+ return strlen(data);
+ }
+ log_print("ipsec_id_size: unrecognized/unsupported ID-type %d (%s)",
+ *id, type);
+ return -1;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Generate a string version of the ID.
+ */
+char *
+ipsec_id_string(u_int8_t *id, size_t id_len)
+{
+ char *buf = 0;
+ char *addrstr = 0;
+ size_t len, size;
+
+ /*
+ * XXX Real ugly way of making the offsets correct. Be aware that id
+ * now will point before the actual buffer and cannot be dereferenced
+ * without an offset larger than or equal to ISAKM_GEN_SZ.
+ */
+ id -= ISAKMP_GEN_SZ;
+
+ /* This is the actual length of the ID data field. */
+ id_len += ISAKMP_GEN_SZ - ISAKMP_ID_DATA_OFF;
+
+ /*
+ * Conservative allocation.
+ * XXX I think the ASN1 DN case can be thought through to give a better
+ * estimate.
+ */
+ size = MAX(sizeof "ipv6/ffff:ffff:ffff:ffff:ffff:ffff:ffff:ffff",
+ sizeof "asn1_dn/" + id_len - ISAKMP_ID_DATA_OFF);
+ buf = malloc(size);
+ if (!buf)
+ /* XXX Log? */
+ goto fail;
+
+ switch (GET_ISAKMP_ID_TYPE(id)) {
+ case IPSEC_ID_IPV4_ADDR:
+ if (id_len < sizeof(struct in_addr))
+ goto fail;
+ util_ntoa(&addrstr, AF_INET, id + ISAKMP_ID_DATA_OFF);
+ if (!addrstr)
+ goto fail;
+ snprintf(buf, size, "ipv4/%s", addrstr);
+ break;
+
+ case IPSEC_ID_IPV6_ADDR:
+ if (id_len < sizeof(struct in6_addr))
+ goto fail;
+ util_ntoa(&addrstr, AF_INET6, id + ISAKMP_ID_DATA_OFF);
+ if (!addrstr)
+ goto fail;
+ snprintf(buf, size, "ipv6/%s", addrstr);
+ break;
+
+ case IPSEC_ID_FQDN:
+ case IPSEC_ID_USER_FQDN:
+ strlcpy(buf,
+ GET_ISAKMP_ID_TYPE(id) == IPSEC_ID_FQDN ? "fqdn/" : "ufqdn/",
+ size);
+ len = strlen(buf);
+
+ memcpy(buf + len, id + ISAKMP_ID_DATA_OFF, id_len);
+ *(buf + len + id_len) = '\0';
+ break;
+
+#ifdef USE_X509
+ case IPSEC_ID_DER_ASN1_DN:
+ strlcpy(buf, "asn1_dn/", size);
+ len = strlen(buf);
+ addrstr = x509_DN_string(id + ISAKMP_ID_DATA_OFF,
+ id_len - ISAKMP_ID_DATA_OFF);
+ if (!addrstr)
+ goto fail;
+ if (size < len + strlen(addrstr) + 1)
+ goto fail;
+ strlcpy(buf + len, addrstr, size - len);
+ break;
+#endif
+
+ default:
+ /* Unknown type. */
+ LOG_DBG((LOG_MISC, 10,
+ "ipsec_id_string: unknown identity type %d\n",
+ GET_ISAKMP_ID_TYPE(id)));
+ goto fail;
+ }
+
+ if (addrstr)
+ free(addrstr);
+ return buf;
+
+fail:
+ if (buf)
+ free(buf);
+ if (addrstr)
+ free(addrstr);
+ return 0;
+}