diff options
| author | Othmar Gsenger <otti@anytun.org> | 2008-05-25 09:50:42 +0000 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Othmar Gsenger <otti@anytun.org> | 2008-05-25 09:50:42 +0000 |
| commit | 71da41451212389bea25d67bc5da696b6d194bff (patch) | |
| tree | a3b20decbd8bc9e47640af5fa4b39f731477955a /keyexchange/isakmpd-20041012/QUESTIONS | |
| parent | improved presentation again (diff) | |
moved keyexchange to http://anytun.org/svn/keyexchange
Diffstat (limited to 'keyexchange/isakmpd-20041012/QUESTIONS')
| -rw-r--r-- | keyexchange/isakmpd-20041012/QUESTIONS | 34 |
1 files changed, 0 insertions, 34 deletions
diff --git a/keyexchange/isakmpd-20041012/QUESTIONS b/keyexchange/isakmpd-20041012/QUESTIONS deleted file mode 100644 index 91225cc..0000000 --- a/keyexchange/isakmpd-20041012/QUESTIONS +++ /dev/null @@ -1,34 +0,0 @@ -$OpenBSD: QUESTIONS,v 1.5 2003/11/05 12:31:21 jmc Exp $ -$EOM: QUESTIONS,v 1.12 1998/10/11 17:11:06 niklas Exp $ - -Does the spec limit the count of SA payloads in a message? Where if so? -[ Only the specific IKE main mode does. In the IKE spec.] - -The message ID field of the header, can it be considered a SA identifier -if used together with the cookiepair? [Yes, it is meant to be that] - -DOI 0, what protocols are defined for it? Where? - -Isn't this a potential DOS attack: -Hostile user listens for ISAKMP traffic, and then extracts cookiepairs -and message IDs which he uses to flood any of the peers with spoofed -packets pretending to be the other one. Most probably these packets will -result in error notifications which potentially result in SA tear-down? -Maybe should notifications never be issued for erroneous packets which -cannot be authenticated? Or should we not tear down SAs as results of -notifications? - -Certicom claims to hold licenses for Elliptic Curve Cryptography? Does this -concern us? See: http://grouper.ieee.org/groups/1363/P1363/patents.html - -Main mode when using public key encryption authentication does not look -like an identity protection exchange to me. Must I really get rid of -the generic ISAKMP payload presense tests? - -IV generation is not described precisely in Appendix B of -oakley-08.txt: -'Subsequent messages MUST use the last CBC encryption block from the previous -message as their IV'. This probably means that we take the new IV from the -last encrypted block of the last message we sent. The SSH testing site uses -the last block from the last message they received. This is probably not -what was meant and should be clarified on ipsec@tis.com. -[ From what we have gathered this is what is meant. ] |